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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies internal and external factors a￿ecting ￿rm outcomes. The
￿rst two chapters explore the sources of variation in managerial skill within an Indian life
insurance ￿rm. The existing literature has investigated the association between manage-
rial productivity and management practices across ￿rms, but has largely overlooked how
individual traits and skills a￿ect managerial performance. Intra-￿rm variation in man-
agerial productivity allows us to study managerial skill without the confounded e￿ects of
variation in management practices. The third chapter models how external technological
change a￿ects competition between media ￿rms, and what that implies for information
availability in a society.
For the ￿rst two chapters, I use a novel dataset drawn from a life insurance ￿rm in
India, with 211 managers, each leading a sales team of insurance agents. Chapter 1 studies
the sources of large variation in performance across teams. I ￿nd that the performance of
newly recruited agents is positively correlated with the managers’ past team productivity
index. I also observe that when agents move across teams in the ￿rm’s internal labor mar-
ket, there is no change in the output of such agents, except when they join the team of a
high performing manager (in the top decile of team performance). This allows me to infer
v
that most managers di￿er from along their recruiting skill, whereas the high performers
are able to provide some form of managerial contribution to productivity such as training,
supervision or guidance.
Chapter 2 examines the dynamics of managerial skills in this ￿rm. I distinguish be-
tween internally-hired managers who were working previously as agents in the ￿rm, and
externally-hired managers, who joined the ￿rm directly as managers. I ￿nd that the teams
of internally-hired managers are 14% more productive, but that the teams of externally-
hired managers catch up in a span of six to seven years. Among di￿erent mechanisms, I
￿nd evidence that the managers di￿er in the recruitment of good workers and also in the
contribution to the output of their workers. Further, I ￿nd evidence that the externally-
hiredmanagers learn how to recruit goodworkers. This is the ￿rst study to show evidence
supporting learning-by-doing on part of managers.
The third chapter, co-authored with Benjamin Ogden, develops a model of endoge-
nous media polarization—or, product di￿erentiation among news sources—to study how
this a￿ects political outcomes. We show that under internet-based technology, where
users provide additional values when they are served their preferred content, media ￿rms
would have an incentive to skew their content, leading to divergence. However, the degree
of divergence will depend on the distribution of audience. Under reasonable restrictions
on the distribution of voters, informed political choices are implemented and in no distri-
bution. The model demonstrates why increasing media polarization does not necessarily
lead to incorrect political outcomes and may in fact create conditions for correct policy
choice.
vi
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1Chapter 1
What Do Good Managers Do? Evidence from
an Insurance Firm in India
Do managers within a ￿rm di￿er in productivity measures? Within-￿rm disparity in
managerial performance holds signi￿cant implications. Many ￿rms, such as multi-plant
manufacturing units or multi-branch sales ￿rms, employ several managers with access to
the same management practices, identical incentives, and similar markets. Dispersion in
performance within this selected group of managers would throw light on how manage-
rial skill impacts ￿rm outcomes. Syverson (2011) emphasizes this distinction by asking
whether the ”skills of those who implement” managerial practices, rather than just the
practices themselves, may also have a role in explaining ￿rm-level productivity. If man-
agerial productivity does vary within a ￿rm, this poses another question - what are the
productive skills of the managers? The role of managers in any ￿rm is broadly de￿ned,
andmanagers perform various, sometimes intangible, tasks. Discovering which skills sep-
arate managers from on another or which manager performs which tasks better may hold
crucial value for ￿rms regarding job design, the transmission of information on productive
skills, etc.
To answer the questions mentioned above—viz., Do managers within a ￿rm di￿er in
productivity and, if so, what do good managers do?—I use four years of panel data on
211 sales-teams, each led by one manager, in a life insurance ￿rm in India. Although the
managers are subject to the same incentives and management practices, their teams di￿er
vastly in performance - the average output in the team at the 90th percentile is ￿ve times
2the average output of the team at the 10th percentile. Further, output per worker and
team size are signi￿cantly and positively correlated: larger teams have, on average, more
productive workers.
The subject ￿rm provides much discretion to the managers and the output gap can
arise for several reasons. For example, managers might be heterogeneous in recruiting
agents, in training and supervising them, or in formulating product and market strategy.
To explore heterogeneity in managerial skill, I correlate output per worker for each team
in 2012 with outcomes of managerial tasks in the years 2013-2015. I ￿nd the following -
1. The output of new recruits is signi￿cantly and positively correlated with the output
per worker in 2012; new recruits of better teams outperform the new recruits of
teams with lower output per worker. This positive correlation could be potentially
due to two main causes—good managers recruit good agents, or good managers
provide more valuable training, supervision, and/or motivation.
2. To isolate one channel from the other, I observe those agents whomove across teams
due to an internal agent-manager matching policy. When a manager exits the ￿rm,
remaining agents of her team, known as “orphaned agents”, are quasi-randomly
matched with other managers over time. Assignment of these agents occurs in
an as-if random manner. This variation in teams for the same agent allows me to
compute the manager value-addition to an agent’s output. Using empirical Bayes
shrinkage on a manager dummy in the change in the output of allotted agents, I
￿nd that the output of an agent allotted this way increases only when the agent
joins the team of a manager in the upper 10th percent of ability, whereas output is
unchanged for agents joining other teams.
3. I also ￿nd that when a high performing manager exits, the output of her agents falls
but no change is observed for agents of other exiting managers.
34. Output can also be a result of market conditions, which may vary across managers.
Using a coarse menu, value and cost of products sold by the agents, I rule out dif-
ferences in market heterogeneity.
Evidence 1, 2, and 3 above state that: (a)output of new recruits varies across managers;
(b) except for the top 10%, managers are unable to increase the output of agents that they
receive quasi-randomly; and (c), except for high-performing managers, output of agents
does not decline when their manager exits. Collectively, these results imply that for 90%
of the managers, skill di￿erential exists in the recruitment of agents, whereas managers in
the upper 10th percentile can add value to their agents’ output in the form of motivation,
guidance, or supervision, etc. Evidence 4 rules out market or customer heterogeneity as
well as team-specialization.
To explore the implications of heterogeneity in recruitment skill, I develop a model
where managers di￿er in the noisiness (or precision) of the signal they receive regard-
ing an agent’s productivity before recruiting him. Agents receive a stochastic outside
option in every period. The model provides four implications- 1) The separation rate
of agents working under more able managers is lower due to better selection; 2) Smaller
separation of agents implies a bigger team of more able managers, keeping tenure of man-
ager constant; 3) The team size of a manager increases at a decreasing rate with respect
to the tenure of the manager. Concavity arises due to two opposing forces: addition of
new agents to the team remains constant as only one agent is recruited each period, but
combined deterioration of the team increases as previously recruited workers exit with
a non-zero probability; 4) Since bigger teams are composed of more productive workers,
team output is convex with respect to team size. All the implications are con￿rmed in the
data.
The paper’s primary contribution is to provide evidence that the managerial skill of
recruitment is a signi￿cant reason for intra-￿rm disparity in managers’/supervisors’ per-
4formance. Most studies have documented the divergence in managerial performance as
due either to the e￿ect of incentives within ￿rms (Bandiera et al. (2009); Shearer (2004)
Bandiera et al., [2007]) or to management practices across ￿rms (Huselid (2016), Ich-
niowski and Prennushi, [1997]; Bloom and Reenen (2010); Bloom et al. (2010)). Lazear
et al. (2015) and Adhvaryu et al. (2016) are recent studies that document managers’ pro-
ductivity as a result of her skill - in the former, training workers in a US-based technology
￿rm, and, in the latter, in reassigning workers to protect from pollution shocks in an In-
dian textile plant in the latter.
This study is distinct from Lazear et al. (2015) and Adhvaryu et al. (2016) in two ways.
First, the ￿rms studied in the other two papers do not allow managers to recruit agents,
whereas in contrast, I ￿nd the main skill di￿erential to lie in recruitment. In addition, I can
also observe in my data the managerial roles studied in the other two papers. In this sense,
in this chapter I will provide a more comprehensive analysis than the other two papers.
Second, output dispersions across managers recorded in this study are higher than those
seen in other papers. One potential reason for higher output dispersion in the subject ￿rm
might be that goodmanagers perform the task of recruitment outside the ￿rmwhere other
managers cannot observe them. As such, di￿usion in the knowledge of recruitment could
be slower, keeping the output gap larger. This is consistent with the theory of tacit versus
codi￿ed knowledge, which is usually invoked to explain why knowledge ￿ow remains
slow in Multi-National Companies (Gupta and Govindarajan (2000)).
The theoretical foundation for links between managerial traits and ￿rm outcomes has
been explored previously(Hambrick and Mason (1984), Ocasio (1997), Dessein and Santos
(2016) and Steen (2016)). Bertrand and Schoar (2002) andCho andHambrick (2006) provide
empirical evidence for links between the background traits of CEOs and their impact on
￿rm outcomes. However, these papers study the behavior of senior executives engaging
in high-level strategic decisions. In contrast, I study the role of mid-level (or lower-level)
5managers, who are closest to the production process.
In the ￿rm, 90% of managers vary in their skill of recruiting productive workers, creat-
ing output dispersion across teams. Many studies of sales-force management reveal that
the individual skill of a salesperson is a stronger determinant of his performance than
other factors such as motivation, personality traits, organizational factors, etc. (Churchill
et al. (1985)). In other settings as well, workforce selection and retention has also been
found to be closely related to ￿rm-level productivity. For instance, Heath (2016) and Bea-
man and Magruder (2012) study the positive e￿ects of recruitment through referrals in
garment ￿rms in Bangladesh and among low-skilled urban workers in India, respectively.
Bender et al. (2016) ￿nd that high-productivitymanufacturing ￿rms in Germany are better
at retaining high human capital workers.
I ￿nd evidence that the top 10% of managers increase the output of their allotted work-
ers. This evidence suggests the presence of “superstars” in the ￿rm. Malmendier and Tate
(2009) and Desai and Jain (1995) study the consequent performance of award-winning
CEOs and the investment advice by prominent money managers, respectively. However,
these studies show that the impact of such superstars is insigni￿cant compared to the
non-superstars.
Finally, the current study can be put into the category of “insider econometrics” - a
term ￿rst coined in Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) - which refers to the study of a ￿rm’s
internal organization to test theories of personnel economics. While what we may lose in
the generalization of the results, we gain in precision. Lazear (1999) provides a survey of
the ￿eld.
Throughout the chapter, I use the masculine pronouns (he, his, him) for the agent and
the feminine pronouns (she, her) for the manager. I will use agents, salespersons, and
workers interchangeably.
61.1 Institutional Background
The subject ￿rm is a life insurance ￿rm that operates across India. The life insurance
industry in India is highly concentrated: the top six ￿rms out of 24 comprise 85% of the
market with the subject ￿rm being one of them1.
1.1.1 Organization Structure of the Firm
Figure 1·1 represents the organizational chart of the subject ￿rm. The ￿rm has a divisional
organization structure, with three hierarchies: zones, divisions, and branches.
Zonal and divisional supervisors implement the strategy laid out by Central Headquar-
ters (located in Mumbai) They also act as information intermediaries - relaying outcomes
to the levels above and transmitting outlay to tiers below2.
Branches are local administrative units populated with one administrator monitoring
several manager-led teams of salespersons. These teams are responsible for selling insur-
ance products. The central authority of the ￿rm determines the product characteristics.
Managers receive a performance-linked payment along with a monthly basic pay. Agents
face a piece-rate compensation.
In this paper, the data comes from one division in the city of Delhi. This division
has 24 branches with 211 managers and around 9000 sales agents. Demographically, this
division covers a population of around 7 million people with a per capita income of US
$4300. Further, the market for this division is highly competitive with all of other 23 ￿rms
operating in the same geographic zone covered by the division.
1More information on the subject ￿rm is available on request since identity of the ￿rm cannot be fully
revealed.
2Despite the diversity of the market, decision-making in the ￿rm is highly centralized. Alonso et al.
(2008) demonstrate, theoretically, adaptation to local needs can be met by centralization conditional on the
alignment of manager’s incentives.
71.1.2 Managers’ and Agents’ Incentives
In the subject￿rm, managers’monthly compensation comprises a￿xed pay and a performance-
based variable pay. Variable pay increases in the total output of a manager’s team and de-
creases in the operational expenses incurred by the manager. These operational expenses
include items such as activation costs of newly recruited agents, travel, and o￿ce-related
expenses, etc. On average, the variable component comprises of 50% of the manager’s
monthly compensation and goes as high as 68% for the most productive managers.
Agents face a piece-rate compensation scheme where they receive a ￿xed share of
the value of the products they sell. The piece rate varies across products, but the overall
incentive structure is uniform for all agents3.
Appendix A.1 provides more details for the incentives structure.
1.1.3 Role of Managers
When a manager joins the ￿rm, her responsibility is to build the team. She has the fol-
lowing discretion:
• Full discretion in recruiting agents: To qualify as an agent, a candidatemust undergo
50 hours of training and pass an online exam. The cost of training and the online
exam are incurred by the ￿rm and billed as an operational expense for the manager.
Conditional on these requirements, a manager has the full responsibility and sole
authority to choose candidates. The responsibility entails searching and assessing a
candidate for the agency and appraising him of the expectations. The ￿rm neither
assists nor intervenes in the process4.
• Guidance and supervision: Quali￿ed agents receive a basic insurance-speci￿c edu-
cation by the ￿rm before joining the team. Once an agent joins the team, training,
3Homogeneous compensation scheme for heterogeneous sales agents is the norm in many industries.
See Daljord et al. (2014), Misra and Nair (2011) and Lo et al. (2011)
4Appendix A.2 provides more details on the recruitment procedure.
8guidance, and supervision of the agent is the manager’s responsibility.
• Conditional discretion on terminating an agency: If, in the ￿rst year of an agent’s
career, the agent sells less than 12 products or the total value of his sales is less than
Rs. 100,000 (USD1,554), then such an agency is terminated. The manager of such
an agent has the discretion to overrule this termination.
• Product and market strategy: The menu of products is decided by the ￿rm’s central
authority and undergoes frequent revisions. Managers can decide the balance of
their portfolio from the menu available. They can also judge how best to distribute
their agents over the menu of products.
All managers, irrespective of tenure or branch, have the same responsibilities.
What can managers not do? A newly-recruited manager cannot join an existing team
or replace some other manager. She is responsible for building the team. The manager
cannot in￿uence or vary compensation schemes for the agents in her team. A manager
cannot alter the product features either, such as by altering premium rates or term lim-
its on insurance products. A manager cannot move to another branch within the same
division. Agents are associated with the branch only through their manager and cannot
choose to move to some other team unless their manager exits.
1.2 Data Description
I use four years of panel data of 211 managers, each leading one team, from 2012-2015,
comprising of around 9000 salespersons across 24 branches in Delhi. For performance
measures of each agent, I can observe number, revenue, and amount insured of total
products sold. Products of the ￿rm can be classi￿ed into two broad categories—single-
premium, where customers pay premiumonly once (at the beginning), andmulti-premium,
where the premium is paid at regular intervals. For each of the product categories, I can
9observe revenue obtained by the agent. I can also observe team size, the tenure of agents
and managers and the gender of managers. Entry of new recruits in the years 2013-2015,
exit of agents in the years 2012- 2014, and allotment of agents from 2013-2015 can be
inferred from unique alpha-numeric codes of agents5.
For an agent’s (and consequently team’s) product portfolio, I can construct three vari-
ables. These are:
• Type of product: I use the ratio of revenue from single premium products over total
revenue as a proxy for type of product sold by each agent.
• Average value of product: To compute value of product, I use the ratio of total
revenue over number of products sold by each agent.
• Average cost of product: For an insurance ￿rm, the cost of a product is the total
amount insured that the ￿rm is liable to pay in the future. To compute average cost
of product, I use the ratio of total amount insured over quantity of product sold by
each agent.
Table 1.1 gives summary statistics on managers and agents. Figure 1·2 plots the his-
togram of output per worker of the teams. The spread of distribution is substantial: the
team at the 90th percentile has an average output ￿ve times that of the team at the 10th
percentile. This measure of spread is comparable in magnitude to average 90-10 total
factor productivity (TFP) ratios across ￿rms in developing countries (Syverson, 2011).
In Figure 1·3, I provide the binned scatter plot between the log of team size and the
log of output per worker, along with the linear ￿t of the conditional expected function.
The slope is signi￿cantly positive, suggesting that bigger teams are also, on average, more
productive.
Positive correlation between output per worker and team size translates into even
more ampli￿ed di￿erences in team output, de￿ned as the number of products sold by the
5Appendix A.4 provides details on construction of key variables
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agents of a team. Figure 1·4 plots the histogram of team output. Now, the team output at
the 90th percentile of output is 20 times than team output at the 10th percentile.
Figure 1·5 plots the histogram of agent output. The ratio of 90-10 productivity level is
close to 20, similar in magnitude to team-level output disparity.
To observe within-team variance in agent’s output, I regress the log of output on man-
ager ￿xed e￿ects. Table 1.2 displays the results. On using manager ￿xed e￿ects, R2 is 9%
and the adjusted R2 is 8.26. An R2 of this magnitude is large when compared to other stud-
ies of salesperson’s performance. For instance, a meta-analysis conducted by Churchill
et al. (1985) shows that, on average, “less than 4% of the variation in salesperson’s perfor-
mance is explained by a single predictor of that performance”. Thus, in the subject ￿rm,
managers are responsible for a substantial variation in the performance of agents.
1.2.1 Index of Team Productivity
As a measure of team productivity, I use the ratio of total team output and team size for
each manager in 2012. This method of arriving at productivity is analogous to estimating
TFP for a manufacturing ￿rm, where residual productivity is recorded after controlling
for major inputs, viz., capital and labor. Further, output per worker for each team has the
following desirable properties:
• Residual output: For a sales-team, labor is the major input in the production func-
tion. Dividing team output by total team size controls for the factor of production.
The residual variance productivity can be attributable to manager’s e￿ectiveness.
• Relevance: Correlation between this metric of managerial ability and log of team
output is high. Total team output is the relevant data point from the ￿rm’s perspec-
tive, against which the manager is rewarded. Owing to this property, output per
6I also run 100 simulations with log of agent output allocated randomly to managers but keeping the
team size the same as in the actual data. The average R2 and adjusted R2 for these 100 simulations is 0.01
and 0.001, respectively.
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worker is a good index of manager’s productivity and ￿rm’s incentives.
• Stability: Output perworker formanagers displays high serial correlation.This prop-
erty indicates the robustness of this metric to idiosyncratic shocks.
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics on this index.
1.3 Tasks of Productive Managers
In this section, I try to discern the tasks of the productive managers. To do so, I correlate
the index of team productivity, i.e., output per worker for each team in the year 2012, with
variables in the years 2013-2015 that are outcomes of managerial tasks.
1.3.1 Performance of New Recruits
Figure 1·6 shows the log of output of a newly recruited agent in years 2013 to 2015 as a
local polynomial curve of the log of team output per worker in 2012. The slope, which is
positive, can be interpreted as the elasticity between a new recruit’s performance and his
team’s output per worker in 2012.
I regress the log of output of new recruits from 2013-2015 on manager-speci￿c vari-
ables. Table 1.3 shows the results. Column (1) controls for log of output per worker in
2012 as an explanatory variable. In Column (2), I control for tenure, square of tenure, and
gender of the manager. Both speci￿cations include year and branch ￿xed e￿ects. The co-
e￿cient on log of output per worker in 2012 is signi￿cant and between 0.23-0.25 in both
speci￿cations.
The above results suggest that the output of a new recruit and average output in a team
are correlated. Many hypotheses could be consistent with this outcome. For instance,
managers may di￿er in selection of agents, or they may vary in training. It may also be
due to factors independent of managers’ e￿orts such as peer e￿ects or positive assortative
matching of agents with teams.
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1.3.2 Output Change for Allotted Agents
To isolate selection from other channels, I observe variation in team-assignment for the
same agent. This variation is obtained from an internal agent-manager matching policy.
In the subject ￿rm, when a manager exits, the recruited agents of her team, now termed
“orphaned,” stay with the ￿rm. Such orphaned agents are then matched to other existing
managers. These agents, who change teams, are known as allotted agents.
According to the allotment rule, an orphaned agent chooses a team in the order of
his revenue in the year before allotment; thus, an orphaned agent with higher revenue
chooses his team ￿rst. A potential issue here is that the matching between alloted agents
and managers may not be random, as agents may choose to go to good managers. To
address that, I plot the log of output per worker in 2012 of the team an orphaned agent is
matched with against the log of revenue of that allotted agent in the pre-allotment year
in Figure 1·7. Table 1.4 provides the results of linear regression. Figure 1·7 shows that
there is no correlation between an agent’s productivity and the output per worker of the
matched team; agent-manager matching due to the allotment policy appears random 7. In
Appendix A.5, I conduct more robustness checks to test the random allocation of allotted
workers to the managers.
I use this policy to observe the di￿erence in the output of orphaned agents before
and after they join a new team. The di￿erence in the output of the allotted agent elim-
inates year ￿xed e￿ect. Any change in agent’s output thus has the interpretation of the
manager’s contribution to an agent’s productivity8. I use the following empirical model:
log Aamb   log Oab =   logkm +  Xm +  t +  ambt
7Another takeaway from Figure 1·7 is that orphaned agents appear indi￿erent among the managers.
Since they are more likely to know the productivity and features of these teams, this apparent indi￿erence
makes the hypothesis of assortative matching between agents and managers weaker.
8The implicit assumptions are that manager and agent e￿ect are separable and agent e￿ect is time-
invariant
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where  Aambt and  
O
ab are, respectively, output of an agent a after and before being
allotted to manager m in branch b at time t . km is team output per worker in 2012. Xm
are manager-speci￿c controls and,  t is year ￿xed e￿ects, respectively. The coe￿cient on
logkm is the elasticity of the change in output of an allotted agent with respect to the log
of team output per worker in 2012. An interpretation of positive   is the value added by
a manager to her agents.
Table 1.5 presents the results of the above empirical model. Value of   is 0.88, which
appears strikingly high; a manager with a one percent point higher ability increases the
output of allotted workers by 88%. An e￿ect of this magnitude requires further explo-
ration.
I investigate the distribution of the above result in Figure 1·8. The vertical axis rep-
resents the change in the log output of allotted agents, and the horizontal axis is the log
of team output per worker of the team in 2012 to whom such agents were allotted. I also
impose a linear ￿t on the scatter plot.
The linear curve has a positive slope. However, Figure 1·8 suggests that the manager
e￿ect is noisy. A few outliers could be driving the positive slope. The spike in the per-
formance of such agents might also be due to idiosyncratic productivity shock and not
due to the managers. Further, the average number of allotted agents per manager is 2.15,
adding more evidence for the noisiness of the e￿ect.
To address this concern and to arrive at a result robust to such noise, I compute empir-
ical Bayes estimates of the manager ￿xed e￿ects. These manager ￿xed e￿ects are obtained
from the following regression:
log Aamb   log Oamb =  m +  t +  amt
An empirical Bayes (EB) estimate for each manager is a weighted average of manager’s
￿xed e￿ect,  ˆm, and themean of  ˆm. In the current context, weight onmanager ￿xed e￿ect
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would vary proportionately with the number of allotted agents per manager and inversely
with within-manager variation in output change of allotted workers. Thus, managers
which provide more information about alloted agents would receive higher weight and
the ones which provide noisier information would receive lower weight. Appendix A.6
provides details for derivation of empirical Bayes estimator. For a detailed discussion and
application of empirical Bayes estimator, see Guarino et al. (2015).
Figure 1·9 plots the EB estimator as a local polynomial curve of log of team output per
worker in 2012. A scatter plot is also provided. The mean of EB estimates (represented by
a red line) for the manager in the upper 10th percentile is signi￿cantly greater than zero,
indicating that these managers are able to add value to the productivity of the allotted
agent. Thus, guidance, supervision, or monitoring by very high-performing managers
may be a signi￿cant component in the productivity of her agents.
Heterogeneity of manager e￿ect between the bottom 90% and top 10% of the managers
can also be explored using the following model:
  log Aamb =  1 logkm⇤1{Bottom90%}+ 1 logkm⇤1{Top90%}+1{Top90%}+ Xm+ t+ ambt
where,  log Aamb is the change in log output of allotted agents, 1{Bottom90%} and1{Top10%}
are indicators for managers in the bottom 90% and top 10%, respectively. In column (2) of
Table 1.5,  1 ,  2 and  2 > 0, suggesting that the top 10% managers are able to increase
the output of their allotted agents whereas the bottom 90% are unable to do so9.
1.3.3 Output Change for Orphaned Agents
Managers might also di￿er in their ability to track, monitor, and enforce agents to work
continuously. Equivalently, managers might accompany agents to “pitch” a product to a
potential client. To test this hypothesis, one can record the change in an agent’s output
9Alternatively, I use the estimator from Gregory and Hansen (1996) to endogenously ￿nd structural
breaks in level and slope of change in output of allotted agents with respect to the index of managerial
productivity. Results are similar.
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when his manager leaves.
In the year 2015, six managers in the ￿rm exited. In Figure 1·10, I plot the change in
the log of output of each orphaned agent when his manager left against the log of output
per worker in 2012. Out of the six managers who exited, only one was a high-performing
manager. The output of the agents of this manager decreased whereas the output of other
agents did not change. This result adds weight to the view that high performing managers
provide some form of supervision or guidance to their workers.
1.3.4 Manager’s Product and Market Strategy
Managers have considerable decision-making power in choosing which product to sell
and which customer demographics to target. Di￿erences in the richness of information
over sub-local demand conditions may drive output dispersion across managers. Such
customer heterogeneity will be re￿ected in the product features of the agents and teams of
the managers. As described in Section 1.2, I construct three metrics of product portfolios:
type, average value, and average cost of products sold.
In Table 1.6, I regress these three variables for newly recruited agents on the log of
team output per worker in 2012, along with other manager-speci￿c controls and branch
and time ￿xed e￿ects. In each model, the coe￿cient on log output per worker in 2012 is
close to zero with a small standard error, ruling out customer and demand heterogeneity
across managers.
Managers might also di￿er in specializing their workforce. For instance, a manager
might be good at discerning her agent’s propensity of selling to a consumer group based
on age, class, caste, etc. If so, a manager would get more out of such an agent than the
one with no particular group to target, potentially contributing to output dispersion10.
To test this hypothesis, I construct a metric of each agent’s specialization, which is the
10Implicit assumption being di￿erences in agent’s propensity to target a customer group. This propensity
can be considered as one dimension of productivity
16
following:
s fambt = | fambt   Em ( fambt ) |
where fambt is agent a’s product feature (type, cost and value) and Em ( fambt ) is the intra-
team mean of that product feature. An agent’s specialization is thus the mean absolute
deviation of the agent’s product feature. I regress new agent’s specialization of each prod-
uct feature on the log of managerial output in 2012 along with other manager-speci￿c
controls and branch and time ￿xed e￿ects. I also control the team’s mean of the product
features in each model which holds the point of reference of standard deviation constant.
A positive (negative) coe￿cient on log of output per worker in 2012 would indicate higher
specialization (generalization) of her agents by themanager. Table 1.7 provides the results.
The coe￿cient on the log of output per worker in 2012 remains close to zero for each of
the product features.
Thus, to the extent that the data allows, market and product heterogeneity can be
ruled out within and across teams11.
Summary of Key Results
I ￿nd that: 1) performance of new recruits is strongly correlated with the metric of man-
ager’s ability; 2) when an orphaned agent is allotted a manager, his output increases only
when joining a manager in the top 10% of output per worker whereas no change is ob-
served for others; 3) when an agent becomes orphaned due to the exit of his manager,
his output declines only when his manager was in the top 10% of output per worker in
2012; and 4) agents within or across teams are not heterogeneous in their product fea-
tures. Evidence 1, 2 and 3 indicate that 90% of the managers vary in the selection of their
agents, whereas the top 10% also contribute to an agent’s productivity12. Evidence 4 rules
11Same result holds true when I consider the sample of all agents as seen in Table 1.8 and Table 1.9.
12Peer e￿ects may also be a plausible reason for this result. While peer e￿ects cannot be fully ruled out,
average team size is 42 and agents seldom work together. This makes peer e￿ects less likely in the given
context.
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out market heterogeneity or agent specialization across managers as a potential source of
output dispersion.
How likely is the managerial skill of agent selection to be the primary reason for the
di￿erence in team output? Similarly, how likely is it that top performers stand out in
their skill of increasing an agent’s output? Through a meta-analysis of 116 empirical
studies, Churchill et al. (1985) found the productivity of the salesperson was the second
most important determinant of sales performance in terms of average correlation with
sales outcome. However, the same study mentions that no single predictor is su￿cient
to explain signi￿cant variation in a salesperson’s performance. Thus, multiple factors
collectively contribute to an agent’s output. These other factors might be the contribution
of the managers in the form of supervision, guidance, monitoring, etc.
These results and the brief discussion above do not disallow other competing mecha-
nisms. Any hypotheses where the output is a function of agent-manager match quality,
rather than agent e￿ect, can provide these results. For instance, consider that managers
can only train the agents that they recruit and not the ones they receive through allotment.
In such cases, selection of agents and training are intertwined and cannot be separated.
A conclusive test to di￿erentiate between agent’s productivity and manager’s contri-
bution in the output of an agent is possible if a new recruit of a manager is randomly
assigned to a di￿erent team at the date of joining. Institutional mechanics do not allow
this experiment. Nevertheless, in Appendix A.7, I test some alternative hypotheses of
managerial contribution in an agent’s output and some robustness tests. For instance,
if managers di￿er only in the selection of agents, then the output gap between their re-
cruited agents should appear immediately and then remain stable over time. On the other
hand, if managers di￿er in training, then the output gap between new recruits should
diverge. In Appendix A.7.1, I test this hypothesis to show that the output gap across new
recruits remains stable over time. If an agent’s production were a function of individual
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attention provided bymanagers, then output and number of new recruits in a team should
be negatively related (rejected in appendix A.7.2); or, if training were e￿ective only at the
beginning of an agent’s career, then managers must be using discretion to retain some
workers to train them next year (rejected in Appendix A.7.3).
1.4 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I will present a model of agent screening by managers. I focus only on the
screening role of the managers since, from the results above, I ￿nd that 90% of managers
vary in their skill of recruiting productive workers. The model serves two purposes. First,
given the institutional settings, it rationalizes how managers may di￿er in the screening
of their new recruits, as found above. Second, given this comparative static result, the
model provides implications on empirical patterns that should hold true across managers.
Consider a ￿rm where managers recruit an agent in each period, who carries out
production. An agent’s production function takes the following form:
 a =  a
where  a is the productivity of the agent (unknown to the agent before being recruited).
The agent’s pay-o￿ is s  and the manager receives (1   s ) , where 0 < s < 1 13. Agents
are of two types:  L with mass q and  H (>  L) with mass 1   q.
Before recruiting an agent, a manager assesses a candidates on the basis of a noisy
signal of his true productivity. This signal takes two values,  ˆa 2 { ˆL, ˆH }. Consider
this signal to consist of all information about the candidate’s suitability for employment
in the ￿rm, such as a description of previous work experience, schooling, temperament,
13Rao (1990) demonstrates that an optimal compensation scheme for heterogeneous sales force consists
of a commission rate and quota-based bonus.
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behavior etc.. The signal is observed with the following conditional probability:
Pr ( ˆk | j ,k , j ) = p (1.1)
(1) can be interpreted as the probability of a “wrong" signal; i.e. if the agent’s actual
productivity is  L ( H ) then with probability p, the manager receives a non-corresponding
signal  ˆH ( ˆL).
I make the following assumptions
Assumption-1: Signals are independent across workers and over time.
Assumption-2: 0 < p < 12
Assumption-3: Signals are costless to managers.
Assumption-4: Manager recruits one agent in each period.
Assumption-5: At each time period t , agent receives  Ao +   as outside option where
  ⇠ N (0,  2) is iid.
Assumptions 1 simpli￿es the analysis. Assumption 2 puts a bound on the noisiness
of the signal; it states that, while neither signal determines the agent type with certainty,
 ˆL ( ˆ H ) is more likely to come from  L ( H ). Assumption 3 states that the manager can
observe as many candidates as possible before choosing someone for recruitment.
Assumptions 4 and 5 re￿ect institutional features of the subject ￿rm and the Indian
insurance industry. In the subject ￿rm, a manager chooses a candidate for agency in the
￿rmwho has to undergo a 50-hour training program and an online exam organized by the
insurance regulator. The ￿rms bills the training cost for each recommended candidate as a
manager’s operational expense and the online exam is held only four times a year14. Since
recruitment opportunities are costly and infrequent, each managers wants to assess many
agents (Assumption 3) but is restricted in the number of agents she can ￿nally recommend
(Assumption 4). This latter assumption also has empirical support - Table 1.10 shows that
14Appendix A.2 provides more institutional details.
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managers do not vary signi￿cantly in the number of agents they hired in the years 2013-
2015. Assumption 5 states that the productivity of the agents is ￿rm-speci￿c. This feature
can also be ensured if agents face a transaction cost while moving away from the subject
￿rm. Appendix A.9 describes some features of the ￿rm that di￿erentiate it from others in
the industry.
1.4.1 Comparative Statics
Manager observes signals of agents and chooses an agent who would maximize the ex-
pected output; i.e. manager’s problem is :
Max ˆa2{ ˆL , ˆ H }E (  | ˆa ) (1.2)
Given Assumption-3, E (  | ˆ H ) > E (  | ˆL)15. Since signals are costless (Assumption-2),
managers would wait until an agent with signal  H is observed. Assumption-1 implies
that the manager will recruit the ￿rst worker with signal ˆ H , since any other agent with
ˆ H would have the same expected outcome.
Thus,
Max ˆa2{ ˆL , ˆ H }E (  | ˆa ) = E (  | ˆ H ) =   H + (1     ) L (1.3)
where
  = Pr ( H | ˆ H ) = (1   p) (1   q)
(1   p) (1   q) + pq
Thus, expected outcome for a manager is the weighted average of an agent’s true pro-
ductivity, where the weights are posterior distribution of the agent’s type given his signal
ˆ H . Given Assumption-3,   increases as p decreases. Thus, if a manager has a less noisy
signal, she is expected to recruit better workers and thus have higher E (  | ˆ H ).
15Proof provided in the Appendix
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1.4.2 Dynamics
In each period, managers observe a new worker16. Given Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4,
the manager repeats the same decision-making process in each period as in the static
case. Thus, for each t, average productivity of the recruits of a manager stays the same as
equation (3).
Testable Implications
Under the dynamic setting, the model provides four testable implications. I will provide
the intuition for the results here. Proof can be found in the Appendix A.8.
Testable Implication-1:
The exit rate of agents of better informed managers is lower.
Under Assumption-5, an agent’s outside option in each period is  Ao +   . An agent
realizes his productivity after working for one period. An agent would exit if his outside
option is greater than his payo￿ in the ￿rm; i.e., s a <  Ao +   . Given that more able
managers—ones with lower p (or higher   )—recruit more productive workers, teams of
such managers would observe lower exit rate of agents.
Testable Implication-2:
The team size of better-informed managers is bigger.
The team of a manager at a given time is the set of agents who were recruited by
that manager. Team size is the number of agents in this set. By Testable Implication-1,
managers with better prior recruit more productive workers who are less likely to exit.
Thus, with time, managers with better prior would have bigger teams.
Testable Implication-3:
Team size is increasing and concave with respect to the tenure of managers.
16In this paper, I abstract away from any learning or experimentation by managers.
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Under Assumption-4, managers recruit only one worker each period. However, each
agent faces a non-zero probability of exit. Initially, team size grows as the number of new
recruits is greater than the exiting agents. Over time, as team size grows, the proportion
of exiting agents counter-weighs the in￿ow of recruited agents. Thus, the team size of a
manager increases initially and then plateaus as tenure increases17.
Testable Implication-4:
Team output exhibits increasing returns to scale with respect to team size.
This result follows from the result of comparative statics, testable implication 1 and
2. Managers with better prior recruit more productive workers who are less likely to exit
and thus form bigger teams. Bigger teams are, therefore, composed of more productive
workers. Hence, team-output will increase more than proportionately with the size of the
agents in the team, leading to convexity in the relationship between output and input.
Discussion of the Model
This model has some explanatory power that other models of recruitment do not. For
example, if managers recruited workers until marginal productivity of the last worker was
equal to the wage, then the positive relation between average output of the team and team
size would depend on the functional form of the production function. In Appendix A.10, I
provide an example. Further, models where managers acted as private good (Lazear et al.
(2015)) or were engaged in monitoring (Calvo and Wellisz (1979)) will also not provide
implication 2.
In the subject ￿rm, recruitment is delegated to the managers and the cost incurred
in training is also transferred to the managers (Appendix A.2). The subject ￿rm, thus,
rewards a manager if her private information over agent productivity is good and penal-
izes her if this information turns out to be poor. In this sense, the above model serves to
capture the essence of private information of the manager over agent productivity. Any
17Calvo and Wellisz (1979) and Garicano and Rossi-hansberg (2005) are other studies which investigate
the reasons for limits to span of control.
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other model where managers possessed private information about the selection of agents
may provide the results without adding any signi￿cant explanatory power.
1.5 Results on Testable Implications
I will use the following notation: km for output per worker in 2012, Xm for manager-
speci￿c controls and Xa for agent-speci￿c controls (which will be described in the given
context),  b and  t for branch and time-￿xed e￿ects.
1.5.1 Exit Rate
Consider the following model:
1ambt {Exit } =   logkm +  Km +  Ka +  b +  t +  ambt
where 1ambt {Exit } is an indicator variable for exit of agent a (equal to 1 if agent left the
￿rm and 0 otherwise) under managerm in branch b at time t . Km and Ka are manager and
agent-speci￿c variables, respectively. The hypothesis is   < 0, i.e., agents of more able
managers (higher km) are less likely to exit.
Table 1.11 provides the results. In Column (1), I use only the log of output per worker
as an explanatory variable. Column (2) controls for tenure, tenure squared, and gender
of the manager. In both regressions, the coe￿cient on the log of output per worker in
2012 is signi￿cantly negative: a manager with a one percent higher output per worker
observes 4.7 -7.4% lower exits of agents. This coe￿cient is close to zero when I control
the output and revenue of products sold by the agent (Column (3)), which is consistent
with di￿erential selection of agents by managers. A re￿ection problem exists in Column
3 since km is composed of the agent’s output in 2012. To avoid this concern, in Column 4,
I use the leave-one-out output per worker for each team as a proxy for km; i.e. I regress
each agent’s exit indicator on the log of team output per worker, leaving out that agent’s
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output from the computation. Results are similar to those in column 3.
Tenure of the agent is endogenous to exit propensity, which may also drive output. To
address this concern, I explore the exit propensity of only newly recruited workers18. By
design, tenure is the same for all the agents in this sample. Table 1.12 provides the results.
In Columns (1) and (2), when agent’s performance variables are not included, coe￿cient
on log of output per worker in 2012 is signi￿cantly negative and comparable to Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 1.12. The signi￿cance of this coe￿cient vanishes in Column (3), when
output and value of agent’s sales are included (although the magnitude is still large). Exit
rates of agents are di￿erent across managers and explained by productivity of the agent.
Agent’s output drives exit propensity. In the ￿rm, agents receive piece-rate compen-
sation. Lazear (2000) shows how a piece-rate incentive scheme in a large auto glass com-
pany attracts and retains high productivity workers. However, in the subject ￿rm, good
managers form the conduit for the entry of productive workers, thereby adding to the
e￿ectiveness of piece-rate compensation. This can be interpreted as reduction in transac-
tion costs by managers (Crook et al., 2012). Stability of the match between workers and
￿rms is also an important resource for the ￿rm if productivity increases during the tenure
of the worker19.
1.5.2 Team Size Growth
Consider the following model:
lognmbt =   logkm +  1tm +  2t2m +  b +  t +  mbt
18As explained above, when a new recruit sells less than 12 products or total products less than Rs.
100,000, she can be ￿red by the manager. Thus, in Table 1.12 I restrict analysis to those new recruits who
clear this cut-o￿ since exit of such an agent is solely her decision and not confounded bymanager’s decision.
19The model can be extended to include this aspect of productivity without any substantial gains in its
explanatory power about current empirical facts.
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wherenmbt is team size ofmanagerm and tm is tenure of themanager. I use robust standard
errors. Hypotheses are   > 0 and  2 < 0 <  1: teams of more able managers are bigger
and team size exhibits concavity in manager’s tenure.
Table 1.13 provides the results. The coe￿cient on the log of team output per worker
in 2012 is signi￿cantly positive, suggesting a strong correlation between manager’s prior
on agent productivity and team size. Further, in Column (2), the coe￿cient on tenure and
tenure square are signi￿cant, with  2 < 0 <  1. Thus, controlling for manager’s ability,
team size grows faster initially, but growth decreases as managers acquire tenure.
These results illustrate the role of the manager in determining the size of the input
for production. While managers may not di￿er in size of input at the beginning of their
careers, input inequality across managers arises over time. Thus, the scale of operation
can vary across units even without any variation in management practice. Growth in
the size of the operation is limited by the tenure of managers. Teams grow initially with
tenure of the manager. Eventually, enough agents exit each year limiting the growth
of teams. Correlation between tenure and output, thus, may arise without the need of
invoking human capital or match quality theories of tenure, though this does not refute
the presence of managers’ human capital.
Growth in team size may also occurs due to variation in number of recruits. In Table
1.10, I show that managers do not di￿er signi￿cantly in their number of entrants, sug-
gesting that team size growth occurs primarily due to agents’ exit propensity of agents as
posited in the model.
1.5.3 Team Output and Team Size
Consider the following model:
logYmbt =  1 lognmbt +  Xm +  b +  t +  ambt
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where Ymbt is team output of managerm and Xm consists of polynomial terms of tenure
and gender of the manager. I use robust standard errors. The hypothesis is   > 1.
Table 1.14 provides the results. In Column (1), I use the log of team size as an explana-
tory variable. The coe￿cient on the log of team size is signi￿cantly greater than 1. In
Column (2), I control for tenure and tenure square as well. Production function still ex-
hibits increasing returns to scale. In Column (3), I use manager ￿xed e￿ects. Coe￿cient
on log team size is 1.17 and cannot be rejected from being greater than 1.
The results provide a novel explanation for increasing returns to scale. Such convexity
of production may also occur due to other reasons. For example, each agent may target
a speci￿c market segment, thereby acquiring the expertise to make more sales. A team
with more agents can, thus, target more segments. However, as described in Table 1.9,
agents within a team do not di￿er in the nature, value, and cost of products they sell.
Another cause of convexity in team output and team size is economies of scale, where a
threshold of agents are required to attain a dominating production function. However, the
individuality of the tasks performed by salesmen makes such positive spillovers within a
team less likely.
This result and the result on team size growth hold interesting implications regard-
ing variation in income payments across managers within ￿rms. While there is growing
inequality in both input and output across managers over time, output increases more
than proportionately with team size. Since managers’ income is linked to aggregate team
output, income inequality across managers is more pronounced.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I show wide dispersion in the output of manager-led teams of salespersons
in a life insurance ￿rm in India, even after controlling for team size, tenure, gender, and
the o￿ce location of the manager. Managers perform several tasks when organizing and
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building their teams. Output dispersion could be a result of any of these managerial tasks
or an aggregate e￿ect of a combination of these tasks. Di￿erences in the performance
of new recruits across managers are signi￿cantly positive with respect to the index of
managerial productivity and remain robust to di￿erent speci￿cations. Evidence for man-
agers providing training, supervision, or guidance (Section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3) is substantial,
but only for managers in the upper 10th percentile (high-performing managers). These
two results taken together indicate that di￿erences in the selection of workers could be
a potential reason for di￿erences in productivity for most managers. However, manage-
rial contribution in the form of training, supervision, or guidance by high-performing
managers cannot be ruled out.
Given the institutional details of the subject ￿rm, I develop a model of agent screen-
ing by managers. The model provides a mechanism of how the managers in the ￿rm may
di￿er in selection of their new recruits. Given this comparative static, the model provides
testable implications that should hold across teams. These implications are: 1) a di￿eren-
tial exit rate of workers across managers,; 2) team size growth with respect to manager’s
expertise and tenure, and 3) a convex functional relation between team-output and team
size. All implications hold true in the data. Thus, the agent- and team-level empirical
patterns observed in the ￿rm are consistent with a model of agent screening.
This chapter is agnostic about learning by managers, i.e., whether the managerial skill
of recruiting improves over time. In Chapter 2, I categorize the managers of this ￿rm
into two types: internally-hired, those who were agents before becoming managers, and
externally-hired, those who joined from outside the ￿rm. I ￿nd that teams of internally-
hired managers are 14% more productive. Further, I ￿nd evidence that externally-hired
managers learn how to recruit better agents, di￿using the output gap. This result sheds
light on human capital, in the form of tenure, as one component of managerial produc-
tivity.
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In the subject ￿rm, a small set of managers can increase the output of their allotted
agents. Thus, some managers di￿er in their skill-set, not merely along one skill. If man-
agers within a ￿rm di￿er in their areas of capabilities, can gains be obtained from special-
ization? For instance, can the ￿rm divide their managerial pool into two types depending
on the tasks they perform - one that specializes in recruiting and the other that special-
izes in supervision or guidance? This exercise would result in variation in management
practices within a ￿rm—an observation which was recently documented in Bloom et al.
(2017). Furthermore, many organizations do have functional hierarchies with specialized
managers, e.g., sales, marketing, etc., which are perhaps exploiting managers specialized
in a skill. Functional hierarchies may thus be considered as an endogenous outcome of
the di￿erences in managerial skills.
The chapter’s main contribution, however, is to demonstrate that what managers can
do (individual know-how) is essential alongside what managers are allowed to do (man-
agement practices). Whether the skills of managers matter more than the tools them-
selves, or vice versa, cannot be answered by the chapter in its present form. The liter-
ature on management practices exploits its variation across ￿rms. In the subject ￿rm,
management practices do not undergo a signi￿cant change during the period of obser-
vation. However, a hypothetical exercise may throw light on the connection between
heterogeneity in managerial skill and management practice. In the ￿rm, managers can-
not alter the incentive/compensation scheme of the agents (one of the practices recorded
in World Management Survey (WMS)). Assume that managers were allocated a budget
to reward their agents for good performance. What would we expect? One prediction is
that all managers could increase the output of their agents through incentives, thereby
increasing the aggregate output in the ￿rm. But managers may di￿er in how they re-
ward agents, thereby increasing the variance of performance. Managers may also vary in
providing incentives within a team. For instance, if they di￿er in spotting talent (as pos-
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tulated here), they may attract even higher quality workers. Or agents within a team may
engage in in￿uence activity, leading to wasteful outcomes (Milgrom (1987) and Milgrom
and Roberts (1987)).
This hypothetical exercise raises another question: How would changes in manage-
ment practice a￿ect the managerial pool? For instance, the subject ￿rm does not allow
managers to alter compensation schemes. Does this prevent some managerial candidates
from joining the ￿rm? More generally, if managers know their talents and skills, do they
sort themselves in the ￿rm that provides themwith the power to exploit their capabilities?
If yes, then the ￿rms with a higher management score may attract more able managers
where these managers can exploit their skill. If managerial talent is in short supply, pro-
ductivity dispersion across ￿rms may persevere—a mechanism (one of many) for Persis-
tence Performance Di￿erences across Seemingly Similar Enterprises (Gibbons and Hen-
derson, 2014). This line of reasoning ￿nds theoretical (Bond, 2017) and empirical support
(Friedrich, 2015).
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1.7 Figures
Figure 1·1: Organization Structure
Zone
Division 1 Division 2 Division N
Branch k Branch M
Manager 1 with 
Team of Agents
Manager m with 
Team of Agents
Branch 1
The ￿rm is divided into nine geographic zones across India which have in total 133 divisions with 2048
local-level branches. A branch is the smallest administrative unit of the ￿rm with multiple manager-led
teams of salespersons. In this paper, all data comes from one division in the city of Delhi with 24 branches
and 211 manager-led teams.
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Figure 1·2: Distribution of Output per Worker
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Observations are at the manager-year level. This ￿gure is the distribution of output per worker of teams.
The solid green line represents the team at the 90th percentile and the dotted red line denotes the team at
the 10th percentile. Ratio between team output at 90th to 10th percentile is ￿ve.
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Figure 1·3: Binned Scatter Plot between Output perWorker and Team Size
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Figure 1·4: Distribution of Team Output
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Observations are at the manager-year level. The solid green line represents the team at the 90th percentile
and the dotted red line denotes the team at the 10th percentile. Ratio between team output at 90th to 10th
percentile is twenty.
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Figure 1·5: Distribution of Agent Output
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Observations are at the agent-year level. The solid green line represents the agent at the 90th percentile
and dotted red line represents the agent at the 10th percentile. The ratio between agent output at 90th to
10th percentile is 20.
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Figure 1·6: Performance of Newly Recruited Agents (2013-2015)
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Vertical axis measures the log of output of newly recruited agents in the ￿rst year of his career. Horizontal
axis measures the log of output per worker in 2012 of the team that the new recruit joins.
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Figure 1·7: Matching between Orphan Agents and Managers
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Horizontal axis measures the log of revenue of allotted agents in the year prior to allotment. Vertical axis
measures the log of output per worker in 2012 of the team that the orphan agent joins.
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Figure 1·8: Change in Output of Agents before and after allotment (2013-
2015)
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Vertical axis measures the di￿erence between the log of output of allotted agents before and after allotment
in the years 2013-2015. Horizontal axis measures the log of output per worker in 2012 of the team which
the alloted agent joins.
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Figure 1·9: Empirical Bayes Estimators of Manager E￿ect in Output
Change of Allotted Agents
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Vertical axis measures Empirical Bayes Estimator of Manager-Value Added to allotted agents. Horizontal
axis measures the log of team output per worker in 2012.
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Figure 1·10: Change in Output of Agents before and after being orphaned
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Vertical axis measures the di￿erence between the log output of orphaned agents before and after being
orphaned in year 2015. Horizontal axis measures the log of team output per worker of the managers who
exit. Note: 3 of the 6 exiting managers were hired in 2013.
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Managers
Mean SD Observations
Output 834.306 1391.763 841
Revenue (Rs.) 158.718 272.663 841
Amount Insured (Rs.) 22.319 39.302 841
Manager Tenure 16.264 8.952 841
Team size 42.551 41.246 841
Output per Worker 17.792 7.805 841
Panel B: Agents
Mean SD Observations
Output 20.066 36.899 39875
Revenue (Rs.) 4.101 17.238 39875
Amount Insured (Rs.) 0.554 1.457 39875
Agent Tenure 7.759 7.444 38811
Panel C: Output Per Worker in 2012
Mean SD Observations
Output per Worker 20.800 7.644 211
Output is the number of products sold. In Panel A and Panel
B, observations are at the manager-year and agent-year level,
respectively.
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Table 1.2: Decomposition of Agent Output
Dpdt. Var. : Log of Agent Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Fixed E￿ect Yes No No Yes
Branch Fixed E￿ect No Yes No No
Manager Fixed E￿ect No No Yes Yes
Observations 39875 39875 39875 39875
R2 0.022 0.011 0.089 0.106
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.011 0.082 0.099
Sample of all agents from 2012-15.
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Table 1.3: Performance of Newly Recruited Agents (2013-2015)
Dpdt. var.: Log of Output of a New Recruit
(1) (2)
Log(Team Output Per Worker in 2012) 0.246⇤⇤⇤ 0.237⇤⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.058)
Manager Tenure 0.012
(0.014)
Manager Tenure Square/100 -0.038
(0.044)
1{Male} 0.061
(0.343)
Observations 4382 4382
Sample of newly recruited workers from 2013-2015. Output is the num-
ber of products sold by an agent in the ￿rst year of his career. Standard
errors are clustered by manager. Branch and year ￿xed e￿ects are pro-
vided for each speci￿cation. Square of the manager tenure has been nor-
malized by 100. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 1.4: Matching between Orphan Agents and Managers
Dpdt. var.: Log of Revenue of Allotted Agents in pre-allotment year
(1)
Log(Team Output Per Worker in 2012) -0.566
(0.422)
Manager Tenure -0.120
(0.078)
Manager Tenure Square/100 0.284
(0.233)
1{Male} -0.217
(0.605)
Observations 127
Branch Fixed E￿ect Yes
Time Fixed E￿ect Yes
Sample consists of orphan agents in 2012-2014. Branch and year ￿xed e￿ects are pro-
vided for each speci￿cation. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent levels,
respectively. Standard errors, shown in parenthesis, are clustered by managers. Square
of the manager tenure has been normalized by 100.
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Table 1.5: Change In Output of Allotted Agents (2013-2015)
(1) (2)
Log(Team Output per Worker in 2012) 0.881⇤⇤⇤
(0.326)
Log(Team Output per Worker in 2012)*1{Bottom90%} 0.264
(0.309)
Log(Team Output per Worker in 2012)*1{Top10%} 3.173⇤⇤⇤
(0.932)
1{Top10%} -9.894⇤⇤⇤
(3.646)
Observations 127 127
Dependent variable is the change in log of output of allotted agents before and af-
tera allotment. Sample consists of agents alloted in years 2013-15. Standard errors,
shown in parentheses, are clustered by manager. Both models control for tenure,
tenure square, and gender of the manager. Year ￿xed e￿ects are provided for each
speci￿cation. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Product Features of New Recruits
Product Type Avg.Cost Avg.Value
Log(Team Output Per Worker in 2012) -0.001 -0.003 -0.029
(0.022) (0.002) (0.020)
Mean 0.133 0.027 0.144
SD (0.29) (0.045) (0.402)
Observations 4356 4382 4382
Results of OLS regression of product features of new recruits from 2013-2015 on the log
of team output per worker in 2012. Tenure and squared tenure of the manager, gender
of the manager, and branch and year ￿xed e￿ects are controlled for in each speci￿cation.
Mean and standard deviation of each product feature for all newly recruited agents are
shown in the table. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by manager.
*/**/*** denotes signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Specialization of New Recruits
MAD(Prod. Type) MAD(Avg. Cost) MAD(Avg. Value)
Log(km) 0.006 0.000 0.010
(0.012) (0.001) (0.007)
Mean 0.017 0.007 0.040
(SD) (0.071) (0.005) (0.74)
Observations 4356 4382 4382
Results of OLS regression of mean absolute deviation for product feature of new
recruits from the mean of the corresponding product feature of new recruits of a
manager on the log of team output per worker in 2012. km is Team Output Per
Worker in 2012. Each model controls for tenure, tenure squared and gender of the
manager, team mean of the corresponding product feature, branch and year ￿xed
e￿ect. Mean and standard deviation of specialization in each product feature of all
newly recruited agents are shown in the table. Standard errors, shown in paren-
theses, are clustered by manager. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent
levels, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Product Features of All Agents
Product Type Avg.Cost Avg.Value
Log(Team Output Per Worker in 2012) -0.025 -0.001 -0.018
(0.022) (0.001) (0.014)
Mean 0.285 0.026 0.186
(SD) (0.35) (0.042) (0.632)
Observations 34393 34553 34553
Results of OLS regression of product features of all agents on the log of team output per
worker in 2012. Tenure, squared tenure, gender of the manager, tenure of agents, squared
tenure of agents, branch and time ￿xed e￿ects are controlled for in each speci￿cation.
Mean and standard deviation of each product feature for all agents are shown in the
table. Standard Errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by manager. */**/*** denotes
signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.9: Specialization of All Agents
MAD(Prod. Type) MAD(Avg. Cost) MAD(Avg. Value)
Log(km) 0.006 -0.000 0.006
(0.007) (0.001) (0.007)
Mean 0.119 0.054 0.007
(SD) (0.148) (0.029) (0.002)
Observations 33734 33858 33858
Results of OLS regression of mean absolute deviation for product feature of all agents
from the mean of the corresponding product feature of agents in the team of a man-
ager on the log of team output per worker in 2012. km is Team Output Per Worker in
2012. Tenure of managers, squared tenure of manager, gender of manager, tenure of
agents, squared tenure of agents, branch and time ￿xed e￿ects are controlled for in each
speci￿cation. Mean and standard deviation of specialization in each product features of
all agents are shown in the table. Each speci￿cation also contains mean of the product
feature. Standard Errors are clustered by manager. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at the
10/5/1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.10: Number of New Recruits
Dpdt. Var. : Log of Number of New Recruits
(1) (2)
Log (Team Output per Worker in 2012) 0.146 0.137
(0.134) (0.153)
Manager Tenure 0.056⇤⇤
(0.024)
Manager Tenure Square/100 -0.221⇤⇤⇤
(0.075)
1{Male} 0.537⇤⇤⇤
(0.188)
Observations 549 549
Branch and year ￿xed e￿ects are provided for each speci￿cation. Stan-
dard errors, shown in parentheses, are robust. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance
at the 10/5/1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 1.11: Exit Probability of Agents
Dpdt. Var.: 1{Exit }
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Team Output Per Worker in 2012) -0.074⇤⇤⇤ -0.047⇤⇤⇤ -0.014
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Log(Leave One Out Output Per Worker) -0.002
(0.012)
Manager Tenure -0.008⇤⇤⇤ -0.008⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Manager Tenure Square/100 0.019⇤ 0.019⇤ 0.021⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
1{Male} 0.016 0.019 0.020
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Output -0.017⇤⇤⇤ -0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004)
Revenue 0.018 0.018
(0.042) (0.042)
Observations 26490 26490 26490 26490
Sample of all agents from 2012-2014. Square of tenure term has been normalized by 100. Output
and revenue of the agent has been normalized by 10 and 100, respectively. Branch and year ￿xed
e￿ects are provided for each speci￿cation. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered
at the manager level. */**/*** denotes signi￿cant at the 10/5/1 percent signi￿cance levels. For
the newly recruited agents in column 4, I impute the leave-one-out output per worker by team
output per worker in 2012.
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Table 1.12: Exit Probability of Newly Recruited Agents
Dpdt. var.: 1{Exit }
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Team Output Per Worker in 2012) -0.073⇤ -0.081⇤ -0.068
(0.040) (0.042) (0.041)
Manager Tenure 0.013 0.012
(0.009) (0.009)
Manager Tenure Square/100 -0.039 -0.039
(0.027) (0.027)
1{Male} -0.015 -0.012
(0.065) (0.066)
Output in Year 1 -0.008⇤⇤⇤
(0.002)
Revenue in Year 1 -0.027
(0.141)
Observations 506 506 506
Sample of newly recruited agents who cleared the cut-o￿ of mandatory re-
tention. Square of tenure term is normalized by 100. Output and revenue of
the agent has been normalized by 10 and 100, respectively. Branch and year
￿xed e￿ects are provided for each speci￿cation. Standard errors, shown in
parenthesis, are clustered by manager. */**/*** denotes signi￿cant at the 10/5/1
percent signi￿cance levels.
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Table 1.13: Team Size Growth
Dpdt. Var.: Log of Team Size
(1) (2)
Log of Output per Worker 0.575⇤⇤⇤ 0.439⇤⇤
(0.210) (0.217)
Manager Tenure 0.104⇤⇤⇤
(0.020)
Manager Tenure Square/100 -0.353⇤⇤⇤
(0.082)
1{Male} 0.315⇤⇤
(0.147)
Observations 841 841
Branch and year ￿xed e￿ects are provided for each
speci￿cation. Square of manager tenure is normal-
ized by 100. Standard errors, shown in parentheses,
are clustered by branch. */**/*** denotes signi￿cant
at the 10/5/1 percent signi￿cance levels.
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Table 1.14: Team Output and Team Size
Dpdt. var. : Log(Team Output)
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Team size) 1.144⇤⇤⇤ 1.106⇤⇤⇤ 1.170⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.036) (0.160)
Manager Tenure 0.041⇤⇤⇤
(0.007)
Manager Tenure Square/100 -0.099⇤⇤⇤
(0.025)
1{Male} -0.039
(0.105)
MFE No No Yes
Observations 841 841 841
Branch and year ￿xed e￿ects are provided for each speci￿cation.
Square of manager tenure is normalized by 100. Standard errors,
shown in parentheses, are clustered by branch. */**/*** denotes
signi￿cant at the 10/5/1 percent signi￿cance levels.
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Chapter 2
Managerial Productivity and Tenure:
Evidence from an Insurance Firm in India
Managers have a signi￿cant impact on worker and ￿rm productivity. Empirical evidence
for this comes from extensive cross-￿rm studies ( Friedrich (2015); Bloom et al. (2013)) and
recentwithin-￿rm research (Lazear et al. (2015); Adhvaryu et al. (2016)). However, this line
of investigation begets the question, What makes a good manager? More particularly, do
traits such as prior ￿rm experience or tenure on the job increase managerial productivity?
In this chapter, I explore the above mentioned questions using a panel dataset of 248
manager-led teams of salespersons in a life insurance ￿rm in India. I ￿nd that, after con-
trolling for the tenure, gender and workplace location of the managers, a team supervised
by a manager hired from within the ￿rm (internally-hired) is 14% more productive than a
team led by a manager hired from the external labor market (externally-hired). Further, I
￿nd that the gradient of productivity with respect to tenure is steeper for the externally-
hired managers. Thus, while internally-hired managers start out at a higher productivity
level, the externally-hired managers are able to grow faster, leading to convergence in the
output of the two teams.
I consider three mechanisms to explain higher productivity of internally-hired man-
agers and the eventual catch-up by the externally-hired ones. These three mechanisms
are:
• Recruitment: Under this hypothesis, the internally-hired managers, having worked
in the ￿rm, may have better information on the productivity of their new recruits.
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Thus, they may recruit better workers, creating the initial productivity gap. How-
ever, externally-hired managers may learn how to recruit good workers as they
acquire tenure, closing out the gap.
• Training: Under this mechanism, the internally-hired managers may provide better
training, supervision, guidance, etc. to their agents, creating the initial output gap.
For example, they may teach their agents sales tricks that they learned when they
themselves worked as agents. As externally-hired managers acquire tenure, they
may learn how to provide useful contribution to their agents, closing the output
gap.
• Retention: Under this mechanism, the internally-hired managers change the com-
position of their teams by preventing the exit of their more productive workers
and/or letting go the bad ones. Externally-hired managers learn these skills as they
acquire tenure.
To test the recruitment mechanism, I regress the output of newly recruited agents on
their manager’s characteristics. I ￿nd that the new recruits of internally-hired managers
are more productive, after controlling for manager characteristics. Further, the gradient
of output of new recruits is higher with respect to the tenure of externally-hired man-
agers. This provides support for the recruitment mechanism but is also consistent with
the training mechanism.
To separate the two channels, I carry out two tests. First, using the ￿rm’s internal labor
market, which allows agents to move across teams, I ￿nd that the output of such agents
increases when they join the team of an internally-hired managers. Second, I explore
the returns to tenure for the agents in the two types of teams. I ￿nd that the agents
of externally-hired managers exhibit a higher return to tenure, but the di￿erence is not
signi￿cant. These two tests provide weak evidence for the training mechanism, although
they do not have signi￿cant power.
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I do not ￿nd any di￿erence in the attrition rate in the two types of teams after con-
trolling for the agent’s output. Hence, I rule out the retention mechanism.
Thus, while I￿nd strong evidence of a productivity gap and di￿erential tenure gradient
between the two types of themanagers, no single mechanism can explain all of the results.
The main contribution of the chapter is to record the productivity di￿erence between
the internally-hired and externally-hired managers in a life insurance ￿rm in India. Ex-
tensive theoretical works (Rosen and Lazear (1982), Chan (1996), Garicano and Rossi-
hansberg (2005), Bose and Lang (2017)) and empirical works Murphy and Zabojnik (2007)
have already established conditions when a ￿rmwould promote an employee fromwithin
instead of recruiting a new employee from outside. In the subject ￿rm, the internally-hired
managers have more productive teams, but they form only 20% of the managerial ￿eet. In
this sense, the chapter provides empirical support for Bond (2017) where a ￿rm promotes
an employee from within but faces a binding constraint on the stock of high productiv-
ity candidate. Thus, the ￿rm falls back on the external labor market to ￿ll managerial
vacancies.
I explore the mechanisms through di￿erent models of learning by managers. There is
a vast literature on learning within a ￿rm. Some of the classic papers include Harris and
Holmstrom (1982), Holmstrom (1999), Farber and Gibbons (1996), Waldman (1984) and
Murphy (1986). However, these papers demonstrate the process of learning a worker’s
true productivity by observing her output over time. In this chapter, the learning process
model is similar to the Beckerian view of human capital accumulation as a function of
tenure in the ￿rm—managers learn to perform tasks better as they acquire tenure. Most
papers in this ￿eld pertain to the process of learning-by-doing in themanufacturing sector
(Hatch and Mowery (1998), Argote and Epple (1990)).
Naeem andWoodru￿ (2013) and Chen (2017) are some recent papers which have stud-
ied productivity di￿erences between male and female managers. To the best of my knowl-
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edge, the present study is the ￿rst to compare performance of managers hired fromwithin
a ￿rm against that of managers hired from outside it.
This study also contributes to the classic debate between the role of human capital
vis-á-vis match quality in the relation between employee productivity and tenure. Using
a bounding procedure similar to that of Topel (1991), I am able to attribute at least 30%
of the productivity gap to the higher human capital of internally-hired managers. Given
that an internally-hired manager works for around 3-5 years as an agent in the ￿rm before
becoming managers, this lower bound is higher than the 25% of wage growth in 10 years
estimated by Topel (1991). I also use number of products sold and revenue collected as
measures of performance, as these are less susceptible to the biases to which othermetrics,
such as wage, are prone
Throughout the chapter, I use feminine pronoun (she, her) formanagers andmasculine
pronouns (he, his, him) for salesperson. I will use agent and worker interchangeably.
2.1 Institutional Overview
The ￿rm under analysis is the same ￿rm that was discussed in Chapter 1. For most of the
institutional details of the ￿rm, such as the market in which it operates, etc., please refer
to Section 1.1 above. Here I will discuss in more detail the speci￿c features of the ￿rm
that are relevant for this chapter
2.1.1 Manager Hiring
Figure 1·1 provides the organizational chart for the ￿rm. Allocation of the managers to the
branches is carried out by the Zonal O￿cers. Demand and supply of managers is balanced
at the divisional level; i.e. demand for managers at the divisional level is absorbed by the
supply of managers at the divisional level.
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Demand for managers arises from vacancies created in the branches due to the res-
ignation, retirement, termination or promotion of existing managers. Total demand for
managers is added up to the divisional level.
Supply of managers is channelled through a two-stage process. Candidates must ap-
pear for an aptitude-based test. Having quali￿ed on the test, candidates appear for an
interview. The test is conducted by an independent agency at the behest of the ￿rm,
whereas interviews are conducted by the Zonal O￿cers.
Zonal managers then allocate the quali￿ed managers to the branches in a division.
2.1.2 Manager-Type
In this study, I will classify the managers into two categories:-
• Internally-hired are those managers who had worked as agents in the ￿rm prior
to becoming managers;
• Externally-hired are those managers who come from the external labor market.
The process of hiring a manager is identical for both types of manager. Whether from
within the ￿rm or from outside, a candidate goes through the same two-stage process.
The ￿rm does not provide incentives to current agents to participate in the test. In this
way, managers choose to appear for the test1.
2.2 Data And Empirical Facts
2.2.1 Summary Statistics
I use a four-year long panel dataset of 248 manager led-teams from 24 branches located
in Delhi. I can observe total number, value of products sold, and amount insured by each
1This is not to say that Zonal O￿cers do not know whether a candidate was an agent in the ￿rm or not
or an agent may not be encouraged by his superiors to appear for the test. Zonal O￿cers do see the resumé
but the test evaluates the candidates on the same metrics. Further, I will show in Section 2.4 how innate
productivity of the two types of managers cannot explain all the results.
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agent as performance variables. I aggregate these three measures for all agents in the
team to obtain performance metrics of the team. I can also observe tenure of the agents
and managers in the ￿rm, and total team size under each manager2.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide summary statistics at the team and agent level, respectively.
In Figures 2·1 and 2·2, I plot the density of log of output per worker and log of revenue
per worker, respectively, for each type of manager. In both ￿gures, the distribution for
internally-hired managers stochastically dominates the distribution for externally-hired
managers—the team productivity of the internally-hired managers has a larger mean with
a lower dispersion. Similar patterns are obtained in Figures 2·3 and 2·4, where I plot the
density of output and revenue of agents of each type of manager, respectively.
2.2.2 Team Productivity
Figure 2·5 provides the binned scatter plot between the log of output per worker for each
type ofmanager andmanager tenure, alongwith a quadratic ￿t of the conditional expected
function. The curve for the externally-hired managers is concave and starts out at a lower
level than the curve for internally-hired managers, which remains invariant with tenure.
To investigate the productivity gap and di￿erential growth of team productivity, I use
the following model:
log mbt = f (Im,Tm ) +  b +  t +  mbt (2.1)
where  mbt is the output per worker for managerm in branch b in year t , Tm is tenure of
manager m, Im is an indicator for a manager which takes a value of 1 for an internally-
hired manager and 0 otherwise.  b and  t are branch and time ￿xed e￿ects, respectively.
Table 2.3 shows the results. I explore the returns to tenure for internally- and externally-
hired managers in Columns (1) and (2), respectively, using a quadratic functional form for
f (Im, ·). Consistent with Figure 2·5, the team productivity of externally-hired managers
2Appendix A.4 provides details on the construction of key variables.
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exhibits an increasing and concave relationship with the tenure of its managers, whereas
the trajectory for the teams of internally-hired managers appears ￿at.
In Columns (3)-(5), I pool the observations of the two types of teams and explore
the extrapolated productivity gap at the beginning of the managers’ careers. Column
(3) shows that after controlling for tenure, gender, branch and year ￿xed e￿ects, teams
of internally-hired managers are 14% more productive. I impose a linear and quadratic
functional form on f (·) in Columns (4) and (5), respectively, and interact tenure terms
with Im to allow for di￿erent returns from tenure for the two types of managers. Steeper
returns for externally-hired managers with respect to tenure is evident in both columns.
The coe￿cient on Im in columns (4) and (5) has the interpretation of the productivity
gap at zero tenure for each manager. However, in the data, there are no internally-hired
managers who were freshly recruited3. Thus, the coe￿cient is based on an extrapolation.
With this caveat in mind, I interpret from column (5) that the extrapolated productivity
gap at the beginning of the managers’ career is 0.908 in log points, which shrinks to 0.041
for managers with ten years of tenure with a standard error of 0.046; within 10 years,
productivity gap dissipates.
In Table 2.4, I conduct the same analysis as in Table 2.3, but use the mean of agent’s
average tenure in each team as an additional control. Results are qualitatively similar to
Table 2.3, but now the extrapolated gap at the beginning of the career in each speci￿ca-
tion is slightly smaller, indicating the role of agents’ quality (proxied by tenure) in team
productivity.
Di￿erential tenure trajectory for the managers, recorded in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, may be
driven by cohort e￿ects (Baker et al. (1994)). For instance, externally-hired managers of
recent cohorts may have come from a low-talent pool due to a shock speci￿c to the exter-
nal labormarket. Such selectionmechanisms imply a higher productivity gap between the
two types of managers with low tenure, and a smaller gap for the earlier cohorts (higher
3There were some freshly recruited externally-hired managers
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tenure). To address this issue, I explore the year-on-year growth rate for the managers.
Speci￿cally, I use the following model:
  log mt = f (Im,Tm ) +  t +  mt (2.2)
where   log mt is the change in log of team productivity of manager m between t and
t   1. Using the ￿rst di￿erence eliminates the time-invariant manager ￿xed e￿ects4. Re-
sults are provided in Table 2.5. Column (1) shows that after eliminating cohort-based
factors, the team productivity of externally-hired grows at a 5% faster rate. This is in
contrast with 1.2% di￿erential in growth rate seen in Column (4) of Table 2.3, which does
not account for time-invariant e￿ects—the gap in time-invariant factors between the two
types of managers was bigger in earlier cohorts.
2.3 Mechanisms
Internally-hired managers operate a more productive team, but the teams of externally-
hired managers exhibit a faster growth in productivity. To understand the reasons for
these empirical facts, I will consider three mechanisms: (1) the internally-hired managers
recruit more productive workers and the externally-hired managers learn how to do this;
(2) managers di￿er in the training they provide to their workers and the di￿erence dis-
sipates as externally-hired managers acquire knowledge with tenure; and, ￿nally, (3) the
internally-hired managers retain more productive workers and the externally-hired man-
agers learn this skill. Appendix B provides theoretical foundations for these mechanisms.
In the next section, I will provide empirical tests for the three mechanisms.
4The implicit assumption is that time-varying and time-invariant e￿ects are independent.
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2.3.1 Mechanism-1: Recruitment
Under this mechanism, the internally-hired managers recruit more productive agents.
Externally-hired managers learn to recruit better agents.
Since the database has observations from 2012-2015, I identify the newly hired agents
in 2013, 2014 and 2015. I then use the following model :
log ambt = f (Im,Tm ) +  b +  t +  ambt
where log ambt is the log of output of agent a under manager m in branch b in year t .
Table 2.6 provides the results.
In Columns (1) to (4), I explore the e￿ect of manager tenure on output of new recruits,
separately for internally- and externally-hired managers, using a quadratic ￿t on f (Im, ·).
Whether with or without manager ￿xed e￿ects, I ￿nd that the output of new recruits
increases with the tenure of the externally-hired managers, whereas the internally-hired
manager’s tenure has much lower explanatory power.
In Columns (5) and (6), I pool the two samples together to measure the extrapolated
performance gap between the new recruits of the two types of managers at the beginning
of the manager’s career. I allow for di￿erent returns from manager tenure by interacting
Im with tenure terms. In both columns, performance of the new recruit rises at a faster
rate with respect to the tenure of the externally-hired managers.
As argued above, the coe￿cient on Im may not hold much interpretation since its
based on an extrapolation at the beginning of the manager’s career. The extrapolated gap
between the new recruits of the two types of managers at the beginning of the manager’s
career is 0.40 in log output, which reduces to 0.039 with a standard error of 0.086, for
managers with 10 years of tenure. Thus, the performance gap between new recruits of
the two types of managers dissipates within 10 years of manager tenure.
Results in Table 2.6 may imply that the managers di￿er in recruiting productive work-
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ers, but these results are also consistent with the training mechanism. For instance, all
new agents may come from the same talent pool but managers di￿er in training, super-
vision, guidance, etc of their agents.
2.3.2 Mechanism-2: Training
To isolate the recruiting mechanism from training, I conduct two tests.
Output Change of Alloted Agents
In the ￿rst test, I observe agents moving across teams. Appendix A.3 provides institutional
details of this internal labor market of the ￿rm. If the internally-hired managers provide
better training initially, then the agents alloted to them should exhibit an increase in their
output.
From 2013-2015, 127 agents move across teams. I use the following model:
log ambt   log ambo = f (Im,Tm ) +  t +  amt
where  ambt is the output of the orphaned agent a after being allotted to manager m in
branch b in year t and  abo is the output of this agent before being alloted. Table 2.7
provides the results.
The coe￿cient on Im in column (1), where I control for manager tenure, is positive and
fairly large, although insigni￿cant. This indicates support for the mechanism of initial
training, although estimates are noisy. However, tenure remains negative in all speci￿ca-
tions, and in columns (2) and (3), interaction between tenure terms and Im are insigni￿cant,
suggesting implausibility of this mechanism in explaining convergence.
Output Growth of Agents
For the second test, I observe the output growth of agents with respect to their tenure for
each type of manager. If the externally-hired managers are learning how to provide train-
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ing, then the growth of an agent’s output should be higher for the agents of externally-
hired managers.
In Figure 2·6, I provide binned scatter plot between the log output of agents in each
type of team and the agent’s tenure, along with a quadratic ￿t of the conditional expected
function. The agents of the internally-hired managers are more productive but the re-
turns from tenure are similar for the two types of agents; the two curves do not exhibit
convergence.
To explore this e￿ect, I estimate the e￿ect of tenure on agent productivity separately
for agents of internally- and externally-hired managers. Consider the following model:
log amt = f (Ta ) +  m +  t +  amt
where,  amt is output of agent a under managerm in year t , Ta is agent a’s tenure and  m
is manager ￿xed e￿ect.
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.8, I impose a quadratic ￿t on f (·). Results show that
the output trajectory with respect to tenure is slightly steeper for the agents of externally-
hired managers, although, the two coe￿cients are not signi￿cantly di￿erent from each
other. Similar results are obtained when I include manager ￿xed e￿ects (Columns (3) and
(4)). Thus, for any given manager, the output growth of agents is not correlated with
manager ￿xed e￿ects.
In Columns (5) and (6), I pool the samples together and use the following model:
log ambt = f (Im,Ta,Tm ) +  b +  t +  ambt
whereTm is manager tenure and  b and  t are branch and time ￿xed e￿ects, respectively.
In Column (5), I impose a linear ￿t on f (·) with interactions between tenure terms and Im,
whereas Column (6) uses a quadratic ￿t with interactions. In Column (5), the interaction
between Im and agent tenure is not signi￿cant, indicating parallel growth rate between
65
the agents in the two types of teams.
As with managers, cohort e￿ects for agents may confound the coe￿cient on tenure of
agents. For example, true returns from tenure may be higher for the agents of externally-
hired managers, but if earlier cohorts of such agents were drawn from low productivity
distributions, then the process of convergence may get attenuated. To address this issue,
I regress the change in the log of output of the two agents on Im in Table 2.9. Taking
￿rst di￿erences eliminates cohort e￿ects. Results show that the output of the agents of
externally-hiredmanagers exhibit a 1.2% faster growth rate (column (1)), but the di￿erence
is not signi￿cant.
2.3.3 Mechanism-3: Retention
Internally-hired managers may provide non-pecuniary utility (dis-utility) to their high
output (low output) workers that prevents (increases) their turnover to monetarily equiv-
alent outside options. For instance, the internally-hired managers may socialize with and
treat their more productive agents better, potentially reducing their exit, and increasing
team productivity. Ho￿man and Tadelis (2018) provides empirical evidence for this man-
agerial behavior in a high-tech ￿rm.
Figure 2·7 provides the binned scatter plot between the exit probability of an agent
and the agent’s output, along with the linear ￿t of the conditional expected function. The
binned scatter plot appears similar for the agents in both types of team, but the slope of
the conditional expected function is ￿atter for the internally-hired.
To test this hypothesis further, I use the following model:
1ambt {Exit } = f ( ambt ) +  m +  t +  ambt
where 1{Exit } is the exit indicator for agent a under managerm in branch b in year t . It
takes value 1 if the agent exited and 0 otherwise.  ambt is the output of this agent and  m
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and  t are manager and year ￿xed e￿ects, respectively. Table 2.10 provides the results.
Columns (1) and (2) quantify the relationship between the exit probability and output
of the agents of the internally- and externally-hired managers, respectively. The coe￿-
cient on  ambt is signi￿cantly negative in both columns, but the gradient is steeper for
the agents of the externally-hired managers. This may be driven by two factors: (a) since
output and exit rate are inversely related, higher average output in the teams of internally-
hired managers keeps the average exit rate of their agents low5, or (b) the externally-hired
managers provide more non-pecuniary utility to their high output agents.
To account for manager-provided non-pecuniary utility, I conduct this analysis with
manager ￿xed e￿ects in Columns (3) and (4). The coe￿cient on  ambt for each type of
agent remains unchanged. Thus, the managers do not provide more non-pecuniary utility
to their high output agents.
Columns (1)-(4) collectively show that the managers are unable to prevent the exit of
their high output worker, over and above what is determined by the agent’s output. How-
ever, this non-pecuniary utility may be a public good that a￿ects all the agents equally
and reduces the level of exit rate for all workers. We know already that the managers
di￿er in recruiting/training their agents (Table 2.6 and 2.7), this added public good utility
may create a larger team of more productive workers for the internally-hired managers
generating higher per capita output, consistent with the results in Table 2.3.
To test this hypothesis, I pool all the observations together and regress the exit rate of
the workers on Im, along with other controls. The e￿ect of the public good utility would
be observed as a di￿erence in the level of exit rate of agents. Column (5) shows that after
controlling for the output of the agents, the coe￿cient on Im is not di￿erent from zero;
the two types of managers do not di￿er in the provision of non-pecuniary public good
utility.
5This hypothesis requires the agent’s outside option to be independent of current earnings. Appendix
A.9 provides arguments for why that may be true.
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In columns (6)-(8), I interact Im with agent output and tenure terms to allow for dif-
ferential relationships between the exit rate of each type of agent and their output and
the tenure of their manager. If the internally-hired managers are better at preventing the
exit of their high output worker, the interaction between agent output and Im should be
negative. However, this hypothesis can be ruled out since the coe￿cient on this term is
positive. The coe￿cient on Im is an extrapolation of the di￿erence in exit rate of agents
with zero output in the two types of teams. Due to the absence of any mass at that point,
this coe￿cient does not hold informative value. However, using the extrapolated coe￿-
cient on Im in column (6), the projected di￿erence between the attrition rate at average
agent output (20) is -0.01 with a standard error of 0.012; an average worker in each team
is almost equally likely to stay in the ￿rm. Interactions between tenure terms and Im do
not have explanatory power, disallowing convergence/di￿erential learning in this skill.
Summary of Results
Results on the mechanisms tell a multi-faceted story. Table 2.6 indicates that the new
recruits of the internally-hired managers perform better, and that the magnitude of the
performance gap attenuates as the externally-hired managers acquire tenure. This lends
support to both the recruitment and initial training mechanisms. Table 2.7 shows that on
being alloted to a team of the internally-hired managers, an orphaned agent’s output goes
up, providing weight to the training mechanism.
Many other hypotheses may be consistent with these results. Managers may di￿er
in imparting one-time non-deteriorating initial training, which creates an immediate im-
pact on the new recruits and alloted agents. However, initial training and recruitment
mechanisms may be present simultaneously. One may not rule out confounding e￿ects
orthogonal to managerial skill. For instance, the results in Table 2.7 could be driven by
peer e￿ects—as agent joins a more productive team, he gets to work with more productive
agents, thereby learning from them. Further, the weak evidence of convergence among
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agents, shown in Table 2.9, could be interpreted as agents learning salesman skills by
themselves, instead of guidance by managers. An ideal test would be if a candidate chosen
by onemanager is randomly reallocated to some othermanager/team before the candidate
joins the ￿rm. Such a test is not possible under current ￿rm mechanics6.
2.4 Other Identi￿cation Checks
2.4.1 Bounding Information Di￿erential
From Column (3) of Table 2.3, we ￿nd that on controlling for tenure, branch, and the
gender of the manager and year ￿xed e￿ects, the internally-hired managers operate a
14% more productive team. However, empirical models in Table 2.3 do not control for
ability-related manager characteristics such as education, test scores, industry experience
etc. These confounding e￿ects suggest that human capital or information di￿erentials
might only be partly responsible for the productivity gap.
To understand the above argument, consider the following: Let kIt (kEt ) be the hu-
man capital of internally-hired managers (externally-hired managers) with tenure t and
let  ¯ I ( ¯E ) be the innate productivity of internally-hired managers (externally-hired man-
agers). Thus, after controlling for tenure of the managers, the projected output gap be-
tween the two types of managers at the beginning of their career can be written as:
 ˆ0 = k
I
0 +  ¯
I   (kE0 +  ¯E )
 ˆ0 = k
I
0   kE0 + ( ¯ I    ¯E )
 ¯ I    ¯E re￿ects innate di￿erences between the two types of managers, which are not
controlled, whereas kI0   kE0 captures the human capital di￿erential.
To address these time-invariant e￿ects, I use the year-on-year di￿erence in team pro-
6An issue with random allocation of agents would be that the incentives for managers to recruit would
have to be altered. But, then the managers may respond to the newer incentives, thereby disallowing an
apple-to-apple comparison.
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ductivity in Table 2.5, which allows me to eliminate   . Consider Column (1) of Table 2.5.
  log mt =   Im +  t +  mt
In the above model,   is the di￿erence in the output gap between the two managers be-
tween t = 0 and t = 1, i.e.,
 ˆ =  ˆ1    ˆ0
 ˆ = kI1 +  ¯
I   (kE1 +  ¯E )   (kI0 +  ¯ I   (kE0 +  ¯E ))
 ˆ = (kI1   kE1 )   (kI0   kE0 )
(kI0   kE0 ) = (kI1   kE1 )    ˆ
If the di￿erence in human capital between two managers remains positive at the end of
the ￿rst year, then   ˆ is the lower bound on the information gap between two managers
at the beginning of their career, i.e., kI1   kE1 > 0 =) kI0   kE0 >   ˆ
From Table 2.5,we know that  ˆ =  0.051. By the above reasoning, (kI0   kE0 ) >   ˆ .
Thus, (kI0  kE0 ) > 0.051. Further, from Table 2.3, we know that  ˆ0 = 0.148. Hence, at least
30% of the productivity gap between two managers can be attributed to human capital7.
For the above reasoning to be valid,  ˆ should be unbiased, i.e., E ( mt ⇤ I ) = 0. Given
that  mt =  mbt+1    mbt , E ( mt ⇤ I ) = 0 =) E[( mbt+1    mbt ) ⇤ I ] = 0. Therefore, the
unbiasedness of  ˆ is equivalent to no serial co-relation in log mbt for the internally-hired
managers. This condition is satis￿ed.
2.4.2 Market and Customer Heterogeneity
A potential cause of productivity dispersion between the teams and agents could be mar-
ket or customer heterogeneity. For instance, somemanagers may havemore precise infor-
mation over demand characteristics of customers, which allows them to sell more. Such
7 ˆ and   ˆ are statistically di￿erent.
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information heterogeneity will be re￿ected in the product portfolio of the agents. As de-
tailed in Section 1.2, I observe three product features. To test this hypothesis, I regress
these three product features of an agent’s portfolio on manager and agent characteristics.
Table 2.11 presents the results; agents of the two types of managers do not di￿er in
the type, value and cost of products.
2.4.3 Specialization Within Teams
Managers are provided full discretion to allocate their agents across di￿erent products.
Assume that the agents di￿er in their propensity to sell a particular type of product or to
cater to a particular customer demographic, and that the managers di￿er in identifying
this talent among their agents. Under this hypothesis, a manager who makes her agents
specialize will have a more productive team.
To test this hypothesis of intra-team specialization of agents, I regress the absolute dis-
tance between an agent’s three product features and the team-level mean of these product
features on agent and manager characteristics along with branch and time ￿xed e￿ects.
Table 2.12 presents the results. The two types of managers do not di￿er in the degree
of specialization within teams.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I ￿nd a high productivity gap between the sales teams of the internally-
hired managers and externally-hired managers in an Indian insurance ￿rm. Further, I ￿nd
evidence of convergence between the productivity of these two types of teams.
No single mechanism can fully explain the reason for the productivity gap and even-
tual catch-up. Among di￿erent channels, I ￿nd evidence of di￿erential e￿ects at the re-
cruiting stage and training by managers; internally-hired managers recruit good workers
and are also able to increase the output of the alloted agents who join them from other
teams. Further, the output gap between the new recruits of the two types of managers
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attenuates as the externally-hired managers acquire tenure. One may interpret this as the
result of the externally-hired managers learning how to recruit good agents. While it is
acknowledged that these e￿ects remain open to di￿erent interpretations, the main contri-
bution of the chapter is to record the productivity gap between internally- and externally-
hired managers in a ￿rm and the fact that this gap closes as externally-hired managers
acquire tenure. The eventual convergence of externally-hired managers with tenure can
be attributed to accumulation of human capital.
The exact nature of the human capital is unclear. For instance, some of the externally-
hired managers may come from another insurance ￿rm. In such cases, human capital is
￿rm-speci￿c. But they may also come from a di￿erent industry, or they may be fresh
graduates who are in their ￿rst job. The human capital gap may then be industry-speci￿c
in the former case, or simply the result of experience in the latter case.
Generalization of the results to other settings remains limited. However, in the context
studied, managers improve their operation of somemanagement practices over time. This
is in contrast to the current literature which considers certain keymanagement practice as
the source of managerial productivity (Bloom et al. (2010), Bloom and Reenen (2010)). The
results indicate that the adoption of management practices might itself be endogenous to
manager speci￿c traits or ￿rm policies.
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2.6 Figures
Figure 2·1: Distribution of Log of Output per Worker by Manager
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Figure 2·2: Distribution of Log of Revenue per Worker by Manager
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Figure 2·3: Distribution of Log of Output by Agents
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Figure 2·4: Distribution of Log of Revenue by Agents
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Figure 2·5: Output per Worker
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
Lo
g 
of
 O
ut
pu
t p
er
 W
or
ke
r
0 10 20 30
Tenure
Internally-hired Externally-hired
This ￿gure is a binned scatter plot between the log of output per worker and the tenure of managers of
each type. Solid blue curve is the quadratic ￿t of the conditional expected function for the internally-hired
managers. Dashed red curve is the quadratic ￿t of the conditional expected function for the externally-hired
managers.
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Figure 2·6: Agent Output
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This ￿gure is a binned scatter plot between the log of agent output and the tenure of agents in each type
of team. Solid blue curve is the quadratic ￿t of the conditional expected function for the agents of the
internally-hired managers. Dashed red curve is the quadratic ￿t of the conditional expected function for
the agents of the externally-hired managers.
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Figure 2·7: Exit Propensity by Team
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This ￿gure is a binned scatter plot between the exit probability of an agent and his output. Solid blue
curve is the linear ￿t of the conditional expected function for the agents in the teams of internally-hired
managers. Dashed red curve is the linear ￿t of the conditional expected function for the agents in the teams
of externally-hired managers.
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Table 2.5: Team Productivity Growth
Dpdt. Var.: Change in Log Output per Worker
(1) (2)
Im -0.051⇤⇤ -0.247⇤⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.073)
 Manager Tenure Square/100 -0.349⇤⇤⇤
(0.125)
 Manager Tenure Square*Im/100 0.603⇤⇤⇤
(0.186)
Observations 689 689
Time ￿xed e￿ects are included in both speci￿cations. Change in Manager
Tenure Square and interaction of change in Manager Tenure Square with
Im are normalized by 100. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
*/**/*** denotes signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Change In Output Of Allotted Agents
Dpdt. Var.: Change in Log Output of Alloted Agents
(1) (2) (3)
Im 0.190 0.846 0.120
(0.136) (0.662) (0.940)
Manager Tenure -0.031⇤⇤ -0.026⇤ -0.156⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.014) (0.044)
Manager Tenure*Im -0.032 0.097
(0.030) (0.122)
Manager Tenure Square/100 0.396⇤⇤
(0.151)
Manager Tenure Square*Im/100 -0.407
(0.385)
1{Male} 0.655⇤⇤⇤ 0.661⇤⇤⇤ 0.598⇤⇤⇤
(0.140) (0.144) (0.159)
Observations 127 127 127
Sample consists of the orphaned agents who were allotted to other managers in 2013-2015.
Branch and year ￿xed e￿ects are included for all speci￿cations. Manager Tenure Square and
interaction of Manager Tenure Square with Im are normalized by 100. Standard errors are clus-
tered at themanager-level. */**/*** denotes signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Output Growth Of Agents
(1) (2)
Im -0.012 -0.025
(0.016) (0.022)
 Agent Tenure Square/100 -0.124⇤⇤
(0.054)
 Agent Tenure Square*Im/100 -0.017
(0.049)
 Manager Tenure Square/100 -0.034
(0.039)
 Manager Tenure Square*Im/100 0.069⇤
(0.041)
Observations 20900 20900
Year ￿xed e￿ects are included in both speci￿cations.
Change in Manager Tenure Square, Agent Tenure Square,
and interactions of change in Manager Tenure Square and
Agent Tenure Square with Im are normalized by 100. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the manager-level. */**/*** de-
notes signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2.11: Market Heterogeneity
Type of Products Avg. Cost Avg. Revenue
Im -0.014 -0.000 -0.018
(0.013) (0.001) (0.015)
Observations 35731 35731 35731
Each speci￿cation includes branch and time ￿xed e￿ects, second or-
der polynomial tenure terms of manager and agents, and gender of
manager. Standard errors are clustered at the manager-level.
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Table 2.12: Team Specialization
MAD(Type of Prod.) MAD(Cost) MAD(Value)
Im 0.003 -0.000 0.007
(0.004) (0.001) (0.007)
Observations 35731 35731 35731
Each speci￿cation includes branch and time ￿xed e￿ects, second order
polynomial tenure terms of manager and agents, and gender of manager
and team-level mean of product features. Standard errors are clustered at
the manager-level.
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Chapter 3
Internet-based Media Competition and
Political Outcomes
The media plays an important role in how voters acquire information regarding policy
proposals. Voters absorb the expert-recommended analysis from a news source in order
to weigh the costs and bene￿ts of a policy. Owing to this, truthfulness and the quality of
information conveyed by the media remains an important issue. In recent years, concern
about the media landscape has become even more pronounced, as the rise in media po-
larization—diverging viewpoints among news sources on the same issues—is considered
as one reason for the concurrent rise in political polarization (e.g., McCarty et al. (2006)),
which may be leading to ine￿cient political outcomes.
Media polarization is often attributed to the new internet-based technology, where
users interact with the opinion pieces they read. This interaction includes sharing, tweet-
ing, liking, and, more broadly speaking, circulating the content to the audience that would
not have seen it otherwise, and attracting these new audiences to the news site. For in-
stance, Stocking et al. (2018) analyzes 9.7 million immigration-related tweets to ￿nd that
around 75% of tweets contained at least one link redirecting readers to a news organiza-
tion. If the propensity of user interaction is a function of one’s preference for opinions,
the bene￿ts of the new technology increase the incentives for news ￿rms to skew their
opinion towards the users’ bias, and further away from reporting the true state of the
world. This divergence and skew is worrying since it could distort the availability of in-
formation in the society, leading to sub-optimal policy choices. The concern over catering
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and pandering to partisan viewers has been raised in prior theoretical (Bernhardt et al.
(2008)) and empirical literature (DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007)), but with a focus upon
cable news.
In order to test these concerns, we build a formal model in which citizens receive opin-
ions on some policy issues and also vote for a policy in an election. We call these citizens
voter-consumers, who are heterogeneous in their preference over policy and opinion.
While unbiased information-seekers want to receive state-relevant information to choose
the correct policy, the biased voter-consumers exhibit con￿rmation bias, consistent with
Gentzkow et al. (2014); i.e. left-biased (right-biased) voter-consumer prefers, ex ante, a
liberal (conservative) policy and also prefers to listen to more left-wing (right-wing) com-
mentators. Voter-consumers receive information from one of two media ￿rms, which
observe the state of the world and compete by committing to a pro￿le of message for
each possible realization of the state. These messages may endorse a policy by providing
opinions or may provide a bland, uninformative reporting, endorsing none of the avail-
able policy options. Having observed (possible) state-relevant messages from their chosen
sources, voter-consumers then update their priors to form their preferences over policies.
We carry out the analysis in two parts. First, we consider the case of old technology
where the primary source of politics-related opinion was cable networks and user interac-
tion was absent. In this setting, ￿rms converge to o￿er the same expected bias. However,
if most consumers exhibit a con￿rmation bias, then the media ￿rms would refrain from
always reporting the truth as it would create disutility for at least one group. Instead,
with a positive probability, the media ￿rms would endorse no policy. One can interpret
this as reporting the headlines without providing opinions, similar to the style of a press
release. When both ￿rms choose to send no opinions, voters receive no information about
the underlying causes of the news and, as such, choice of policy remains uninformed.
In the second part, we consider the case of new technology, where users provide addi-
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tional rents to the media ￿rms by circulating an article when it endorses the policy they
prefer. We show that with the increase in value from the new technology, the incentive
for divergence increases. One ￿rm would provide a state-invariant slant to gain rents
from the biggest biased group, leaving the other ￿rm to cater to the remaining popula-
tion. The degree of divergence, however, would depend on the relative mass of unbiased
consumers. If the unbiased viewers are present in su￿cient quantity, the second ￿rm
would reveal the truth to attract them. In this case, new technology increases the aggre-
gate level of information in society leading to informed policy choices. However, if these
unbiased viewers are too small, the ￿rm would divert to the other extreme by providing
state-invariant slant. Now, the unbiased viewers would be unable to update their priors
as messages from either of the ￿rms remain state-invariant. Thus, the concerns regarding
internet-based media are contingent on the electorate, and requires further investigation.
The literature on media bias and political outcomes is vast and growing (e.g., Grose-
close and Milyo (2005) Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Prior (2005), Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2006), Duggan andMartinelli (2010), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), Puglisi (2011)).
For a general overview of the ￿eld, see Prat and Stromberg (2011). By focusing upon me-
dia ￿rms which report information about the state of the world, we di￿erentiate ourselves
fully from one subset of the literature which focuses on media as endorsement heuristics
for voters (e.g., Chiang and Knight (2011); Castaneda and Martinelli (2016)).
The literature on endogenous media bias can be divided according to supply driven
bias or demand driven bias. Under supply driven media bias, political capture of me-
dia ￿rms, either through direct bribes (McMillan and Zoido (2004)) or editor/owner bias
(Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)), drives the skew of the content. In such settings, politi-
cal bias and e￿ciency is reducing due to competition and specialization (e.g., Besley and
Burgess (2006); Gentzkow et al. (2006); Anderson and Mclaren (2012); Sobbrio (2014); see
Baron (2006) for an exception). In contrast, we show that under the new technology, as one
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￿rm specializes its content, the incentives to reveal state-relevant information increases
for the media.
The above strand of literature studies how political factors, such as in￿uence of po-
litical parties, a￿ect media environment through the supply side. We, on the other hand,
analyze demand-driven endogenous media bias to study the relationship in the opposite
direction—how media polarization a￿ects political outcomes. Similar to our primary set-
ting, papers in this sphere focus on biased consumers and pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms which
respond to the demand for bias, generatingmedia polarization ( Mullainathan and Shleifer
(2005); Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006); see Oliveros (2015) for an exceptionwhere consumer
preferences are inversely related to media preferences). However, they considered neither
the trade-o￿ for voters between preference for slant and preference for information, the
technology shift that would lead to a specialized media, nor the ex-post political outcome.
Chan and Suen (2008) considermedia that are exogenously limited in their ability to report
the full truth, while Stromberg (2004) considers an increasing returns to scale technology
(broadcast media), which provides incentive to cater to the group based on its size, but
does not yield divergence in the media space.
3.1 Model
There exists a state of the world (unobserved to the voter),   2 { 1,1}, each of which is
equally likely. There exists a policy space a 2 { 1,1}.
For example, consider the issue of whether minimumwage should be increased to $15
per hour or not. The underlying state of the world is the elasticity of labor demand; if
elasticity is greater than 1, then the correct policy is to not raise minimum wage whereas
if labor demand is fairly inelastic, then minimum wage should be increased.
Denote by aˆ the policy function that maps from state space  2 { 1,1} to policy space
a 2 { 1,1}. Thus, aˆ determines the chosen policy for each state of the world.
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3.1.1 Media Firms
There are two media ￿rms,   2 {1,2}1, which observe the true state of the world and send
a message m. Message, m, belongs to the set { 1,1,0}, where m =  1 is interpreted as
endorsing policy a =  1, whereas m = 1 corresponds to recommending policy a = 1.
Message m = 0 represents a neutral content that merely states the headlines, without
providing any opinions or analysis for recommended policy. Here, one can consider the
example of the Associated Press or Reuters.
Firms commit in advance to a strategy that speci￿es a deterministic message to be
sent in each state. They can randomize ex ante over di￿erent strategies. The realization
of these strategies is observable to voters, who then choose one media ￿rm. Denote a
media strategy by mˆ. Let M = {mT ,m  ,mr ,ml ,mR,mL} be the set of strategies for media
￿rms, de￿ned as follows:
Truth-telling,mT where
mT =
(
m =  1 :   =  1
m = 1 :   = 1
Moderate Right Slant,mr , where
mr =
(
m = 0 :   =  1
m = 1 :   = 1
Moderate Left Slant,ml , where
ml =
(
m =  1 :   =  1
m = 0 :   = 1
Extreme Right Slant,mR , wherem = 18 
1In Appendix C, we provide an extension with N ￿rms.
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Extreme Left Slant,mL, wherem =  18 
Moderation,m  , wherem = 08 
When ￿rms commit to mT , the recommended policy changes with the state of the
world, whereas m  provides headlines without any opinions/analysis. With mr (ml ), a
media ￿rm provides a detailed opinion piece for a policy whenever  = 1( 1) but refrains
from holding any position when   =  1(1). mR andmL represent extreme skew where
the news ￿rm takes a stand on policy matters that remains invariant to the state of the
world2.
Firms stick to the committed message when the state of the world is revealed. How-
ever, before the state is realized, ￿rms can potentially randomize over media strategies in
M. The realized strategy from randomization is revealed before the state occurs.
3.1.2 Voters/Consumers
The population is composed of a unit mass of voter-consumers of types i 2 {L,R,U }.
Voter-consumers are heterogeneous in their preference over policy a 2 { 1,1} and media
strategies M.
The utility function for voter type i ,Ui (aˆ,mˆ; ), takes the following form:
Ui (aˆ,mˆ; ) =  (m( )   bi ( ))2   (a( )   bi ( ))2,
where, bR ( ) = 18 , bL ( ) =  18 , and bU ( ) =  . m( ) is the message in mˆ and
a( ) is the implemented policy when state is  .
Let P (i ) be the mass of voter type i . De￿ne P (i = L) =  , P (i = R) =   and P (i = U ) =
µ. In order to make the problem interesting, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: 12 > max { , ,µ},   > µ and   >  
2For eg; consider conspiracies about ‘Deep State’ propagated by conservative news sources in the US,
with respect to Mueller investigation.
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Thus, none of the groups compose by itself a majority. Second and third inequalities
state that the right-biased group is the largest group. This simpli￿es the analysis without
any loss of generality.
For any given message,m, voter types i = L or i = R have state-invariant preference
for policies, where i = L(R) prefers a =  1(1) 8 . In this sense, i 2 {L,R} are biased
voter-consumers who have made up their minds regarding the policy solution and are
unin￿uenced by any state-relevant information. We call them biased groups with i = L(R)
de￿ned as the left-biased(right-biased) group. On the other hand, preference of i = U
over policy varies with the true state of the world. This group does not exhibit a strong
ideological predisposition for policy solution. We call these voters “updaters”, since their
preference are capable of changing over the state of the world. Updaters are then the
pivotal voters. We assume the prior beliefs of the updaters are uniform. Thus, if the state
remains unknown, then the updaters are indi￿erent between the two policies. In that
case, we assume the updaters choose either policy with equal probability, and split evenly
between them.
The biased groups prefer opinions that re￿ect their ex post preference for policy,
whereas the updaters treat any state-relevant information as useful. One can consider
that the biased viewers receive a strong signal for one state before the media ￿rms re-
veal their messages. This induces them to believe that only one state is possible, and any
messages by the media ￿rms to the contrary are given less or no weight at all. Updaters,
on the other hand, do not receive such signals and rely solely on the messages from the
media ￿rms to become informed about the state of the world. Having no pre-determined
information, the updaters consider each state to be equally likely, generating uniform
priors.
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3.1.3 Timeline
1. Media ￿rms commit to a strategy, which is revealed to the voter-consumers. If
￿rms randomize over strategy, the realized strategy pair from this randomization is
revealed to the voter-consumers.
2. Voter-consumers choose one and only one media ￿rm depending on its strategy
pro￿le3.
3. A state is realized, which is observed by the media ￿rms. A message is issued, and
the voter-consumers update their priors to form preferences over policy.
3.1.4 Preference Ordering Of Voter/Consumers Over News Source
Let a( ) 2 { 1,1} be the eventual policy chosen by the majority of voters for a given  .
Since the updaters are pivotal, if they consider   =  1 to be more likely than   = 1, then
a( ) =  1. Otherwise, a = 1 is chosen.
De￿ne
Vi (mˆ) =  E  (m( )   bi ( ))2   E  (a( )   bi ( ))2,
as the ex ante utility of a voter-consumer i from a media strategy mˆ. Each voter takes the
equilibrium a( ) as given. The additive separability of the utility function implies that
the voter-consumer’s preference for media ￿rm depends only on the ￿rst term of Vi (mˆ).
Thus, Vi (mˆ) determines i’s preferences over M.
Since biased groups do not change their policy preference after receiving messages,
Vi (mˆ) for i 2 {L,R} can be written as:
Vi (mˆ) =  E  (m( )   bi )2 + Ki
3Constraints on the choice over media ￿rm stems from the opportunity cost of voters, rather than the
price of following news. Indeed, whether it is the old technology or the new, choice of news is infra-marginal
to the price of accessing the news.
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where Ki is independent of mˆ chosen by i 2 {L,R}.
Updaters, on the other hand, can alter their policy preference on receiving messages.
Further, updaters change their beliefs over   after observing messages. Thus, for the
updaters, ex ante utility from mˆ is:
VU (mˆ) =  E ;mˆ (m( )    )2   E ;mˆ (a( )    )2,
where E ;mˆ denotes the updated beliefs over   for the chosen mˆ.
We can order i’s preference over M as the following:4
for i = R,mR  mr  m   mT  ml  mL
for i = L,mL  ml  m   mT  mr  mR
for i = U ,mT  mr ⇠ml  m   mR ⇠mL
When the updaters are indi￿erent between two media strategies, we assume they split
evenly between the two options.
3.1.5 Pro￿t Function for Media Firms
Given the above preferences of the voter-consumers, media ￿rms compete to maximize
pro￿ts, which depend on the size of each group and value from each group (Stromberg
(2004)). We will consider the following linear pro￿t function,   :
   =  i i fi (  )
where  i is the value provided by group i 2 {L,R,U } and fi (  ) is the share of group i
watching news channel   . In particular,  i will depend on the technology of the media
￿rms, which will be described later.
4Preference ordering derived in Appendix C
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3.2 Equilibrium
Media ￿rms pick their strategymˆ1 andmˆ2 tomaximize their pro￿ts given the preference of
voter-consumers. The pair of media strategies which forms a Nash Equilibrium between
media ￿rms will be themedia equilibrium.
Having chosen the news sources, the updaters observe messages and then update their
beliefs regarding the state of the world to form preferences about policies. A policy pre-
ferred by the majority of the voters will be the chosen policy de￿ned as the political
equilibrium. Given Assumption-1, the updaters are the pivotal voters. Thus, the policy
preferred by the updaters determines the political equilibrium.
The following analysis is divided into two parts. First, we describe the old technology,
where user interaction was limited. We explore media and political equilibria in that
situation. Then, we explain how the new technology that allows user interaction di￿ers
from the old technology in terms of the value provided by the users. With the new value
schedule, we characterize media and political equilibria under the new technology.
3.3 Old Technology
Under the old technology, the mode of news delivery is the mass media, such as cable
networks. The viewers are passive and any endorsements or dissemination of opinion is
limited. Recall the pro￿t function for media ￿rm:
   =  i i fi (  )
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: Under old technology,  i = 18 i 2 {L,R,U }.
Assumption 1 implies that the pro￿ts of media ￿rm   increase in the aggregate viewer-
ship of the news channel. Table C.1 provides the payo￿ for ￿rms for each possible media
strategy pair.
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3.3.1 Media Equilibria Under Old Technology
Theorem 1: Under the old technology, there is a unique Nash equilibrium where both
￿rms select an identicalmixed strategy that assigns positive probabilityweights tomT ,m  ,mr .
The proof is provided inAppendix C. The intuition is as follows. Amoderate slant such
as mr will dominate an extreme slant, since the updaters prefer state-varying messages
since it has informative value, whereas mR or mL is preferred by only one biased group
whenmr is available. Given that   >  ,mr will also dominateml . The best response to
mr is mT as it attracts all the updaters and the left-baised group, which is greater than
half. But, the best response tomT ism  since it attracts both sets of biased audience, again
greater than half. However, the best response tom  ismr , since it attracts the right-biased
group and the updaters. Thus, we seek a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium in these three
strategies.
3.3.2 Political Equilibrium Under Old Technology
Theorem 2: Under old technology,
a = 1 is chosen by majority with probability 1 when   = 1.
a =  1 is chosen by majority with a positive probability less than 1 when   =  1.
The proof is provided in Appendix C. Whenever both ￿rms play m  , the updaters
receive no state-contingent information. Thus, their posterior beliefs remain the same as
their priors. Updaters evenly split between the two policies. Given   >  , a = 1 is chosen
whenever both ￿rms playm  .
3.4 New Technology
Under the new technology, news sources exist online and users interact with opinion
pieces through liking, commenting, providing feedback, and more generally disseminat-
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ing opinion pieces further. By interacting with the news website in this manner, the au-
dience is involved in spreading the recommendation beyond the audience that arrives on
the site directly (Stocking et al. (2018)). In this manner, the viewers act as vehicle of en-
dorsement for the news ￿rm. Hence, media ￿rms receive additional tra￿c and viewership,
resulting in higher value.
However, viewers vary in their degree of interaction after observing the content of the
news sites. For instance, a biased viewer who ￿nds an opinion piece opposed to (aligned
with) her view is unlikely (likely) to endorse it on her social network. Evidence for this
behavior is recorded in Kalogeropoulos et al. (2017), where using a cross-national sample
of online news users, the authors ￿nd positive and negative spiral of user interaction
depending upon engagement with the news.
Owing to this behavior of the voter-consumer, the value provided by i , i , is contingent
on the transmitted messages of the media ￿rms. We make the following assumptions
about  i under the new technology:
For i = R,
 R =
(
  (> 1) :m = 1 for any  
1 : otherwise
For i = L,
 L =
(
  (> 1) :m =  1 for any 
1 : otherwise
For i = U ,
 U =
8>><>>:
  (> 1) :m = 1 s .t . Pr (  = 1|m = 1;mˆ) = 1
  (> 1) :m =  1 s .t . Pr (  =  1|m =  1;mˆ) = 1
1 : otherwise
Biased groups provide value when their ex post preferred policy is endorsed regardless
of the state of the world. Updaters, on the other hand, require a policy endorsement to
reveal the true state of the world without any uncertainty. Note that the updaters do not
provide any value whenm = 0, even when it reveals the true state of the world (eg; when
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m = 0 for a ￿rm that chooses mˆ =mr ). This is consistent with the interpretation ofm = 0
as reporting without providing opinions which does not get retweeted, liked or circulated.
Consider the following example of pro￿t realization for two ￿rms under the new tech-
nology. Let ￿rm-1 choose mR and ￿rm-2 commit to mT . Given the preference ordering
of voter-consumers, i = R choosemR , whereas the remaining groups follow ￿rm-2. Now,
expected pro￿ts for ￿rm-1,  1, are given by:
 1 = E  ( R )
 1 = Pr (  = 1) mPr (m |  = 1;mR ) R  +
Pr (  =  1) mPr (m |  =  1;mR ) R 
Sincem( ) = 18  undermR ,    =   8 . Thus,  1 = 12   + 12   =   .
Firm-2 attracts i 2 {L,U }. Thus, its pro￿ts are:
 2 = E  ( U µ + L )
 2 = Pr (  = 1) mPr (m |  = 1;mT ) ( U µ + L ) +
Pr (  =  1) mPr (m |  =  1;mT ) ( U µ + L )
UndermT , m(1) = 1, andm( 1) =  1. Therefore,  L =   when   =  1 and  L = 1
otherwise. Further, from posterior probabilities derived above, Pr (  = 1|m = 1;mT ) =
Pr (  =  1|m =  1;mT ) = 1. Thus, we get  U =   8 . Hence, expected pro￿ts for ￿rm-2
are:  2 = 12 ( µ +  ) +
1
2 ( µ +  ) =  µ +
 +1
2  .
Table C.2 provides the payo￿ for ￿rms for each possible media strategy pair.
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3.4.1 Media Equilibria under the New Technology
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 3:max {2µ,2 } >  
Assumption 3 provides a su￿cient condition to disallow the equilibrium where both
media ￿rms cater to the right biased group.
Theorem 3: Under the new technology with Assumption 3,
If µ    2 , then for a su￿ciently high value of  , the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
is of the form (mˆ  ,mˆ   ) = (mR,mT ) where   2 {1,2} indexes ￿rms.
If µ <  2 , then for a su￿ciently high value of  , the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
is of the form (mˆ  ,mˆ   ) = (mR,mL) where   2 {1,2} indexes ￿rms.
Appendix C provides the proof. The intuition is the following. One ￿rm acquires
the biggest group. The rents from the biggest group restrict the ￿rm from deviating and
losing value from this group. This is consistent with DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), which
analyses the entry of Fox News Network in capturing the conservative audience. Another
￿rm faces a trade-o￿ between attracting rents from all the updaters or slanting towards
left to gain more rents from left-biased group. If the updaters constitute a su￿cient mass
(µ    2 ), then the incentive to not lose the updaters outweighs the additional rents from
the left-biased group for a su￿ciently high value of  . However, if the updaters constitute
a small mass, and if the value from user interaction is high enough, then ￿rm-2 would
have an incentive to gain value from the left-biased group at the cost of losing the value
from the updaters.
Note that (mR,mT ) as an equilibrium can be obtained even if µ <  ; revelation of truth
is possible even when the updaters are the smallest group.
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3.4.2 Political Equilibrium under the New Technology
Theorem 4: Under Assumptions 2 and 3, and with new technology,
If µ    2 , then a =   is chosen by majority for each   2 { 1,1}.
If µ <  2 , then a = 1 is chosen by majority 8  2 { 1,1}.
When µ    2 , the strategy pro￿le in the media equilibrium is (mR,mT ). Updaters
receive true information about the state of the world. Thus, for each state of the world,
the updaters are fully informed. Since the updaters are the pivotal voters in this case, the
policy preferred by them is the chosen policy.
On the other hand, if µ <  2 , the media strategy pro￿le is (mR,mL). Updaters choose
mT and receive state-invariant messages whichever news channel they watch and, hence,
do not improve their beliefs about the state of the world, staying indi￿erent between the
two policies. Since   >  , a = 1 is chosen irrespective of the state of the world and the
policy choice remains uninformed.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide a possible explanation of how the internet-based interactive
technology of media ￿rms may induce ￿rms to diverge their stand on political issues.
Further, how such divergence a￿ects information availability depends discontinuously
on the mass of unbiased viewers. If the electorate is already ideologically polarized with
little demand for state-contingent information, then pro￿t-motivated media ￿rms would
only con￿rmwhat themajority considers preferable. However, the preference of unbiased
viewers cannot be overlooked if they constitute a big enough consumer bloc (even though
they may be the smallest group). In such a case, one media ￿rm would alway report the
true state of the world.
This chapter identi￿es two incentives for media ￿rms that have been overlooked in the
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previous literature. First, with con￿rmation bias among voter-consumers, convergence
of content among media ￿rms need not imply truth-telling. This is because su￿ciently
strong con￿rmation bias deters ￿rms from displeasing biased consumers. Second, under
the new technology, media ￿rms would gain additional rents from the biased groups and
thus can a￿ord to let go of the other biased group by providing state-contingent slant.
Therefore, specialization and competition could lead to better information availability,
contrary to some of the theoretical models, but consistent with the empirical evidence,
e.g., Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011), Gentzkow et al. (2014), and Schroeder and Stone (2015).
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter-1
A.1 Managerial Incentives
A manager’s incentives are governed by a comparison of her annual remuneration and
the total revenue collected by her team in that year. Annual remuneration consists of a
￿xed composition such as basic pay, dearness allowance, and other refundable expenses
such as work-related expenses, travel allowance, etc.. Total revenue consists of premium
payments on products sold in a given year, known as First Year Premium. The ratio of
annual remuneration and total revenue is known as the cost ratio. If cost ratio is lower
than a predetermined limit (19% in this division), the manager becomes eligible for incre-
ments in ￿xed components and other incentive schemes. On the other hand, penalties
and disincentives are levied on the manager if the cost ratio exceeds the predetermined
limit. These penalties increase with respect to the amount the Cost Ration exceeds this
limit and with respect to the duration it persists above this limit.
If the cost ratio is lower than 19% for a manager, then she receives an incremental raise
in her basic pay, ￿xed pay, and travel-related expenses. Further, she becomes eligible for
other incentive schemes. For example, if on the team of a manager the number of agents
who sell more than 20 products in a year, de￿ned as productive agents, is more than 18,
then the manager receives 2.5% of the bonus for each productive agent over 18. Also, if
a manager fails to recruit at least ￿ve agents in the previous year, then the performance
based bonus is reduced by 0.5%. Managers are also rewarded on the persistence of their
teams, i.e,. if a manager is able to retain 90% of her agents from the previous year, then
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the manager receives Rs.100-Rs.200 per agent.
Asmentioned above, If the cost ratio exceeds 19%, then themanager becomes ineligible
for incentive schemes and faces decrement in basic pay in the following manner.
Table A.1: Table of Disincentive
1st Occasion 2nd Occasion 3rd and Subsequent Occasion
2%<CR - EL <4% No Increment No Increment No Increment
CR - EL >4% No Increment No Increment 1 Decrement
32% <CR <35% No Increment 1 Decrement 2 Decrement
CR >35% 1 Decrement 1 Decrement 1 Decrement
The magnitude of the cost ratio also determines service termination for managers. A
manager is ￿red if any of the following are true:
• her cost ratio exceeds 50% in any year;
• her cost ratio exceeds 45% in any year and the aggregate cost ratio of the preceding
two years exceeds 50%;
• her cost ratio exceeds 40% in any year and the aggregate cost ratio of the preceding
two years exceeds 47.50%;
• her cost ratio exceeds 38% in any year and the aggregate cost ratio of the preceding
two years exceeds 38%.
The structure of the incentive scheme forces a manager to keep her cost ratio low;
i.e., keep total revenue high without increasing annual remuneration too much. Low-
productivity workers increase operational costs, which constitute a variable part of an-
nual remuneration. For example, agents can bill the ￿rm for work-related expenses such
as traveling or client service. Further, agents receive a commission even on premium
payments of products sold previously, but that amount does not form a part of the to-
tal revenue. As such, some less motivated agents have a lower incentive to bring First
Year Premium as compared to a manager. Thus, without highly motivated and productive
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workers on her team, it is di￿cult for the manager to keep the cost ratio low. All of this
implies that managers have a strong incentive to increase the productivity of their team.
A.2 Recruitment Procedure
To recruit an agent into the ￿rm, a manager has to follow this process :
• A manager chooses a candidate for agency and enrolls him with the ￿rm.
• Once enrolled with the ￿rm, the agent is registered for a 50-hour training and an on-
line exam. The training and online exam is conducted by the Insurance Regulatory
and Development Authority (IRDA) of India.
• The ￿rm incurs the cost of training and the online exam. However, the cost is billed
as an operational expense of the manager.
• If the agent quali￿es on the test, he receives a certi￿cate to conduct agency and sell
the ￿rm’s insurance products.
• The test is held once in each quarter. Further, in each quarter, exams are held only
on four days. Thus, e￿ectively, the exams are held 16 times each year.
The managers incur a cost for each attempted recruitment and the time window to re-
cruit agents is limited. Such restrictions imply that managers have an incentive to recruit
good agents.
A.3 Allotment Policy for Orphaned Workers
Orphaned workers are de￿ned as those agents whose managers have exited the ￿rm.
These workers are allotted to other managers. The following procedure is used for match-
ing:
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• Allotable agents are ranked by the total revenue they obtained in the previous year.
Preference of selecting a manager is given according to this ranking.
• The consent of a manager is required for the allotment to be carried out. If an
orphaned agent does not get allotted due to lack of consent of the manager, then
this agent is allotted to the next preferred manager.
• Allotment is conducted by Divisional O￿cers.
• The output of the allotted agent after being matched to a new manager is counted
in the total team output of the manager. As such, the manager receives the com-
pensation de￿ned by the incentive scheme.
• An allotted agent may ask to be detached from the team within three years of the
allotment. Once separated from the team, a now-orphaned agent would not be re-
allotted to the team of the manager from whom he requested to be detached.
A.4 Construction of Key Variables
The data was obtained from the management information system of the ￿rm. In this
system, each employee is identi￿ed through a unique numeric or alpha-numeric code
assigned at the time of entry that stays constant throughout the employee’s career. An
exited employee’s codes are not reassigned to new entrants. Further, the dataset includes
the manager’s code alongside each agent’s code, which is used to match each agent with
his manager and identify teams of each manager.
A.4.1 Tenure of Managers and Agents
The codes for managers are numeric and in reverse-chronological order, i.e., a more recent
entrant is assigned a numerically higher code than a manager recruited before her.
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I use this reverse-chronological property of the codes to construct tenure. First, for a
randomly picked sample of codes, I inquired about the exact joining date, which the ￿rm
was generously willing to provide. This allowed me to construct an incomplete mapping
between codes and tenure. For the codes, which were out of the initial sample, I imputed
tenure by putting it equal to the tenure of the numerically nearest code for which tenure
was obtained. (The mapping is available on request).
For agents, codes are alpha-numeric, with the alphabetical component represents the
branch code for the agent. The rest of the code exhibits the reverse-chronological property
and thus, a similar procedure was applied.
A.4.2 Entering, Exiting, and Allotted Agents
To identify entrants, I matched the codes of all agents in one year to the codes in the
preceding year. Given that a new code is assigned to each entrant, the codes that were
not matched were considered new entrants. This procedure, thus, gave me entrants for
the second, third, and fourth year of my dataset (2013-2015). For exiting agents, codes
from one year were matched to the succeeding year, giving me unmatched codes (exiters,
this time) for years 2012, 2013, and 2014.
When an agents becomes orphaned, he is assigned a numeric code in place of the code
of his previous manager. This numeric code is common for all such orphaned agents.
When an orphaned agent is allotted to a manager, this “orphan" code is replaced by the
new manager’s numeric code. I isolated all those orphaned agents whose orphan codes
changed from one year to another.
A.4.3 Team Size
As explained above, each agent is tagged with the code of his manager. A team can be
de￿ned as a set of agents with a common manager code. The size of this set was de￿ned
and used as team size.
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A.5 Robustness Checks for RandomAllocation of Allotted Agents
I provide more tests on random allocation of allotted agents to the managers.
Comparison of Receiving Managers and Non-Receiving Managers
During the time of this study, 59 managers, out of 211, received allotted agents. The set of
59 managers who received allotted agents could be di￿erent from the 152 managers who
did not. I check if these two sets are balanced across the observable covariates—tenure,
team output per worker, team output, and team size. I de￿ne the set of 59 managers as
the Receiving Managers and the remaining set of 152 as the Non-Receiving Managers.
Figure A·1: Receiving versus Non-Receiving Managers
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Figure ?? displays the box plot for the two sets of managers. The middle line in each
box represents the median value for the observable covariates of that set. Each box con-
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tains 50% of the observations for each set of the managers.
For tenure and team output per worker, the two sets overlap. Team output and team
size are slightly larger for the Receiving managers, but not without considerable overlap.
Thus, managers who receive allotted agents are not too di￿erent from the ones who
do not.
Revealed Preference of Allotted Agents
Allotted agents are allowed to choose anymanager theywant. I observed only the realized
choices of the allotted agents and not the full preference ordering of the allotted agents
over the managers. Informal interactions reveal that allotted agents prefer to stay within
the branch with which they started out. This inclination is due to commuting concerns.
If so, agents may have lexicographic preference; allotted agents choose a branch and then
choose the best manager from the available set of managers in that branch.
To explore this concern, I compared the realized choices of the allotted agents with
the quality of other managers in that branch.
Mean Count
1{If joining a team below max. of the branch} 0.960 121
1{If joining a team below mean of the branch} 0.520 66
1{If joining a team below med. of the branch} 0.457 58
Observations 127
Table A.5 shows that 52% of the allotted agents choose a manager below the average
manager in that branch, and 45% of the allotted agents choose amanager below themedian
manager in that branch. Thus, to the extent that the realized choices reveal the preferences
of the allotted agents, it appears that the selection is orthogonal to the managerial quality
as I de￿ne it.
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A.6 Empirical Bayes Estimation
I use the following model:
log Aambt   log Oamb =  t +  b +  m +  ambt (A.1)
where  m is manager ￿xed e￿ect, assumed to be random with a variance   2m and  ambt is
an idiosyncratic component with variance   2  . The above model can be rewritten as:
log Aambt   log Oamb =  t +  b + ambt (A.2)
where ambt =  m +  ambt has variance   2  =  
2
m +  
2
  . An estimator of   2  is
 ˜ 2  =
 a t ˜  2ambt
N   K (A.3)
where ˜ ambt is the predicted residuals of (3), N is the number of observations, and K is
the degree of freedom.
The empirical Bayes (EB) estimator,  ⇤m, of manager ￿xed e￿ect,  m, is de￿ned as:
 ⇤m =
  2m
  2m +
  2 
Nm
Em ( ˆ ambt ) (A.4)
where Em ( ˆ ambt ) is the within-manager average of residuals and Nm is the number of
allotted agents for each manager. To compute  ⇤m, estimators of   2m and   2  are needed.
For an estimator of   2  , I compute:
 ˜ 2  =
 a t ( ˜ ambt   Em ˜ ambt )2
N  M (A.5)
where Em ˜ ambt is within-manager average of OLS residuals and M is the number of man-
agers.
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I use
 ˜ 2m =  ˜
2
     ˜ 2  (A.6)
as an estimate of   2m, where  ˜ 2  is obtained from (5) and  ˜
2
  is obtained from (7).
I plug (8) and (7) in (6) to obtain EB estimate.
A.7 Additional Tests for Manager’s Contribution
In this section, I provide some robustness checks and tests for alternative hypotheses of the
managerial contribution to an agent’s productivity. Neither one single test conclusively,
nor all of them collectively, rule out all forms of manager’s contribution. However, these
tests reject, to an extent, di￿erent hypotheses about the manager’s contribution to an
agent’s productivity.
A.7.1 Output Gap Trajectory between New Recruits
Assume that the e￿ect of training occurs over time. In particular, assume the production
function of agent a under managerm at time t,  ma , to have the following form:
 ma (t ) =  a +  mt (A.7)
where  a is the agent-speci￿c productivity, t > 0 is the time for which the agent has been
with the manager and  m is the value added by a’s manager in the form of training or
guidance. If we impose  m = 0, we obtain the model in Section 3.
Now, if managers di￿er in the training of workers, then the output gap between newly
recruited agents across managers would grow over time, i.e.,
 m0 >  m =) d 
m0
a (t )
dt
>
d ma (t )
dt
On the other hand, if 8m,  m = 0, then no such gap should be observed with time.
To test this hypothesis, I construct a balanced panel of new recruits from 2013 who
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survived until 2015 I observe the performance of new recruits of managers in each year. I
then use the following model:
log ambt =   logkm +   tt +   logkm ⇤ tt +  b +  ambt
where log ambt is log of output of agent a under manager m in branch b at time t, t is time
trend, and km is team output per worker in 2012 for the manager.
If managers di￿er in training and if training took some time to take e￿ect, then output
gap among agents should be larger in subsequent years;   > 0. Table ?? displays the
results.
Log of Agent Output
Log of Team Output per Worker in 2012 0.344⇤⇤
(0.147)
T 0.149
(0.160)
Log of Team Output per Worker in 2012*T -0.097⇤
(0.055)
BFE Yes
Observations 2025
Tenure, square of tenure of the manager, branch ￿xed e￿ects and time ￿xed
e￿ects are controlled in the speci￿cation. Standard errors, shown in paren-
theses, are clustered by manager. Sample consists of those new recruits in
2013 who survived in the ￿rm until 2015. */**/*** denotes signi￿cant at the
10/5/1 percent signi￿cance levels, respectively.
  < 0; variance in agent’s output across managers appears to decrease with time.
This result might suggest that managers are heterogeneous in training their workers. In
Figure ??, I explore the output gap semi-parametrically. Figure suggests that the output
of new recruits remains stable in 2013 and 2014. In 2015, output gap for all agents goes
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down, leading to a contraction in output gap. Thus, one cannot conclude that managers
are heterogeneous in training.
Figure A·2: Output Gap Trajectory of New Recruits
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A.7.2 Agent Productivity and Managerial Attention
Assume that agent production is a function of the manager’s attention that the agent
receives in the ￿rst year of his career. Now, assume manager divides her attention equally
among all newly recruited agents. Thus,
 a =
km
n
where n is the number of new recruits. In the ￿rm, km and n both are decision variables
of the manager; i.e. n is endogenous to manager’s decision. Thus, within a team, the
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mean output of new recruits and number of new recruits are inversely related. I use the
following model;
log( ¯ a |m ) =   logn +  m +  t +  amt
where ¯ a |m is the mean output of new recruits a of managerm, n is the number of new
recruits and  m is manager ￿xed e￿ect. Table C.1 provides the results:
Mean Output of New Recruits
Number of New Recruits 0.039
(0.028)
Observations 561
Manager Fixed E￿ects Yes
The coe￿cient on number of new recruits is positive and insigni￿cant.
A.7.3 Subsequent Performance of Discretionary Retained Agents
In the ￿rm, if any agent—in the ￿rst year of his career—fails to sell less than 12 products
or sell products worth less than Rs. 100,000 (US 1,500), then such an agency is terminated.
The manager,however, can decide to retain such to-be-￿red agent.
If a manager decided to retain such agents and output of agents was functional only
on training by manager, then she should provide more training to the retained agents.
Thus, an increase in output should be observed in the second year of retained agents.
The ￿gure below summarizes the result for this hypothesis. The blue curve is a local
polynomial ￿t of log of retained agent’s output in year 1 and log output per worker in 2012.
The blue curve is the same but for agent’s output in year 2. The grey band is the 95% CI.
Output of the agent between two years does not undergo upward transition, rejecting this
hypothesis.
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Figure A·3: Change in Output of Retained Workers
A.8 Proofs of Testable Implications
A.8.1 Exit Rate of Agents
For any given team of a manager with prior p; exit probability is given by :
Pr (Exit |  ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 :  ( s L  
A
o
  )
1     :  ( s H  Ao  )   ( s L  
A
o
  )
1 : 1   ( s H  Ao  )
where (.) is the distribution function of standard normal and 1   is the probability
of  a =  L.
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Thus,
Pr (Exit |  ) = 1   [ (s L    
A
o
 
) +   ( (
s H    Ao
 
)   (s L    
A
o
 
))] (A.9)
(4) states that as   increases Pr (Exit ) decreases; if a manager has a better prior (lower p),
then his team is less likely to have lower productivity workers (lower 1   ), and thus the
probability of exit decreases.
A.8.2 Team Size Growth
The probability of an agent staying with the ￿rm can be written as 1   Pr (Exit |  ). Thus,
Pr (Sta  |  ) =  (s L    
A
o
 
) +   ( (
s H    Ao
 
)   (s L    
A
o
 
)) (A.10)
Let Team size, Nt , be the total number of workers in the team of a manager at time t.
Now,
Nt =  
t
 =1(Pr (Sta  |  )) 
i.e. expected team size at t is the sum of probability of an agent recruited at   staying in
the ￿rm for t     periods.
Nt =
1   (Pr (Sta  |  )t
1   Pr (Sta  |  ) (A.11)
From (6), one sees that team size is higher for higher   . A manager with a better prior
(higher   ) would recruit better workers who are less likely to exit. Thus, for a given t
(tenure of the manager), a manager with better prior would have a bigger team.
From (6), we can also see that controlling for   , team size is increasing and concave
in tenure. This is because:
dNt
dt
=
 1
1   Pr (Sta  |  )Pr (Sta  |  )
tlo (Pr (Sta  |  ))
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and
d2Nt
dt2
=
 1
1   Pr (Sta  |  )Pr (Sta  |  )
tlo (Pr (Sta  |  ))2
Since lo (Pr (Sta  |  )) < 0, d2Ntdt2 < 0 < dNtdt
Intuition is the following. Managers recruit one worker every period but with some
probability they lose the workers recruited in previous periods. Thus, initially team size
grows but over time the growth starts tapering o￿.
A.8.3 Team Output and Team Size
De￿ne total output of a team at t, Yt , as the sum of output from each agent in a team.
Yt =
1   (Pr (Sta  |  )t
1   Pr (Sta  |  E  (  )
Yt = NtE  (  )
Now, team size is an increasing function of   . By Implicit Function theorem, we can write
E  (  ) =  (Nt ) where  0 > 0. Thus,
Yt = Nt (Nt ) (A.12)
(7) suggests thatYt would exhibit increasing returns to scale with respect toNt . Simply
put, better managers recruit more productive agents who stay longer in the team. Thus,
bigger teams are composed of more productive workers.
A.9 Potential Sources of Firm Speci￿city
Some of the unique characteristics of the subject ￿rm are as follows:
• The subject ￿rm relies on manager-led teams of agents for product distribution,
which is known as a tied-agency model. Most other ￿rms rely on corporate agency
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model, where ￿rms sell products through partnership with other private ￿rms. This
unique distribution model has bestowed certain advantages onto the agents of the
subject ￿rm vis-a-vis other ￿rms in the industry. For example, the regulator did
not establish well-suited rules to prevent mis-selling by corporate agents1. Due to
misselling and fraud committed by other ￿rms, public trust in insurance ￿rms is low
in India. However, the subject ￿rm remained immune to bad press due to very little
reliance on the corporate agency model. Further, tied-agency models have been
less susceptible to misselling since agents are usually active in their networks and
have to remain accountable. It is worth mentioning here that the sales agents of the
subject ￿rm have exploited the news of unfair practices by other ￿rms as a part of
their sales pitch.
• The subject ￿rm’s product menu is di￿erentiated from other ￿rms. For instance, the
￿rm regularly sells products geared towards increasing social welfare rather than
just providing the highest possible returns.
• Another reason for ￿rm-speci￿city is the following: According to regulations, for
an agent to change ￿rms, he has to undergo 25 hours of training. The cost of this re-
training is incurred by the new ￿rm. This training requirement of training imposes
two constraints - 1), the agent has ￿rst to ensure his payo￿ in the new ￿rm exceeds
his payo￿ in the current ￿rm net of foregone income due to training and 2), the ￿rm
has to ensure that the productivity of the incoming agent is more than the costs to be
incurred on him. These constraints imply lower turnover of agents between ￿rms.
A.10 Alternative Model
Consider the following production function:
1See: http://www.livemint.com/Money/Xo38Z0zzeKW7Ee8ddP0RWL/Im-calling-from-Irda-and-will-
help-you-redeem-your-policy.html
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Y = AL 
where L is the number of workers, A is the managerial contribution and   < 1.
Each manager recruits until the marginal productivity of the last agent is equal to the
wage,  ;
 AL  1 =  
Now, L is increasing in A. However, average output in the team is AL L =
 
  which re-
mains constant. Thus, in this model, team size and output per worker are not positively
correlated.
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Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter-2
Consider the following production function:
 amt =  a + km +  t
where,  a 2 { L, H } is agent’s productivity, and km is managerm’s contribution.  L <  H
and  L <  H .
Let q be the mass of  L
Assume that the productivity shock is independent of the agent’s productivity.
Managers may also provide costless non-pecuniary utility,  m, to their agents.
B.1 Mechanism-1: Recruitment
Before recruiting an agent, a manager receives a noisy signal,  ˆa , of the agent’s productiv-
ity. The signal takes two values:  ˆa 2 { ˆL, ˆH }. The signal is observed with the following
conditional probability:
Pr ( ˆk | j ;k , j ) = p
i.e. if the candidate has a productivity of  L ( H ), then with probability p, the manager
receives the signal  ˆH ( ˆL). Consider the following assumptions:
Assumption-1a: Signals are independent across candidates.
Assumption-1b: 0 < p < 12
Assumption-1c: Signals are costless to managers.
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Let pI (pE ) be the conditional probability signal received by internally-hired manager
(externally-hired manager).
Assumption-1d: pI < pE
Assumption-1b states that the probability of making amistake in assessing a candidate
for the job is bounded above by 12 , whereas Assumption-1d implies that internally-hired
managers are less likely to make mistakes than externally-hired managers.
Testable Implications
The manager’s problem is:
Max ˆa2{ ˆL , ˆH }E (  | ˆa )
Now,
E (  | ˆH ) =  L + Pr ( H | ˆH ) ( H    L)
and,
E (  | ˆL) =  L + Pr ( H | ˆL) ( H    L)
Given assumption-1b,
Pr ( H | ˆH ) = 11 + p1 p q1 q
> Pr ( H | ˆL) = 1
1 + 1 pp
q
1 q
Thus, given costless signals and independence of signals over candidates, managers
would recruit the ￿rst candidate with signal ˆ H . Further, given that internally-hired man-
agers assess candidates better than externally-hired managers, we have:
E (  | ˆH ; I ) > E (  | ˆH ;E)
This provides us with the ￿rst implications:
Testable Implication - 1a: Newly recruited agents of internally-hired managers sell
more output than the newly recruited agents of externally-hired managers.
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In the subject ￿rm, managers recruit their agents four times each year, and incur a
cost for each potential recruitment (as described in Appendix A.2). Thus, managers may
observe the signal of a candidate in one period but may not recruit that candidate. In the
next period, the manager may observe this agent again (if he is still available on the job
market). Thus, managers observe some agents multiple times before recruiting them.
Let ( ˆk ) | k=1 be the history of signals for a candidate observed for   periods and let
kl (kh ) be the number of periods for which the signal was  ˆL ( ˆH ). Let,
   = Pr ( H |( ˆk ) | k=1,  ) =
1
1 + ( p1 p )kh kl
q
1 q
Now,
E (  |( ˆk ) | k=1,  ) =  L +    ( H    L)
As kh   kl increases, E (  |( ˆk ) | k=1,  ) increases. Thus, as ˆ H signals accumulate more than
 ˆL, the manager’s assessment of that candidate improves.
Characterize a candidate, a, by the di￿erence between his high and low productivity
signals; i.e. xa  = kh   kl
Result-1: E (xa;  ,p, H ) is increasing in  
E (xa;  ,p, H ) = E (kh   kl ;  ,p, H ) =   (1   p)    p =   (1   2p)
Since, p < 12 , then
@
@  E (x
a;  ,p, H ) = (1   2p) > 0
Thus, E (xa; t ,p, H ) increases with   for  H and decreases in time for  L.
Result-2: 8    2@a such that xa    2
Consider a candidate with xa    2. In the next period, the candidate would either
receive a high or a low signal. Thus, xa +1   3 or xa +1   1. For a new candidate a
0 ,
xa
0
=  1 or xa0 = 1. Thus, a new candidate always weakly dominates a candidate who has
2 low signals more than high signals, and as such, a candidate with xa    2 is replaced.
Thus, if high productivity candidate is observed over time, he is more likely to be as-
sessed as a high productivity by the manager, whereas a low productivity candidate is
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dropped. Hence, with each given year of tenure, managers would recruit better candi-
dates; i.e. @E (  |p)@  .
Testable Implication - 1b: Newly recruited agents of higher tenured managers sell
more output.
While the internally-hired managers would recruit better agents initially, for each ad-
ditional year of tenure (signals), externally-hired managers would learn to recruit more
productive workers. Thus, by assumption-1d; i.e. pI < pE =) E (xa; t ,pI , H ) >
E (xa; t ,pE , H ) =) @E (  |  ,pI )@  < @E (  |  ,pE )@ 
Testable Implication - 1c: Gradient of output of newly recruited agents is higher
with respect to the tenure of the externally-hired managers.
B.2 Mechanism-2: Training
For orphaned agents, the production function is:
 at =  a +  t
As they are allotted to new managers, the change in output of such agents will be:
 amt+1    at = km +  t+1    t
Thus, change in the output of such allotted agents is attributable to managerial contri-
bution. Let kIm (kEm ) be managerial capital of internally-hired manager (externally-hired
manager).
Assumption - 2a: kIm > kEm
Assumption - 2b: km is increasing with tenure of the manager.
From assumptions 2a and 2b, we get
Testable Implication - 2a: Change in output is higher for orphaned agents allotted
to the internally-hired managers.
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Testable Implication - 2b: Change in output is higher for orphaned agents allotted
to managers with higher tenure.
B.3 Mechanism-3: Retention
Let Uam = f ( a, m ) be the utility function of agent a where  a is agent’s output, and  m
is the non-pecuniary utility provided by the agent’s managerm.
Assumption - 3a: f1( a, m ) > 0 and f2( a, m ) > 0
Let Uao = G +  a be the outside option for agent a where  a ⇠ N (0,  2) and G is some
constant1. An agent exits if Uao > Uam or  a > f ( a, m )  G. Thus, the probability of an
agent’s exit is Pr (  > f ( a, m )  G ) = 1   ( f ( a , m ) G  ), where  (·) is standard normal
distribution function. Let  Im ( Em ) be the non-pecuniary utility provided by an internally-
hired manager.
Assumption - 3b:  Im >  Em
Assumption-3b states that the internally-hired managers provide more utility to their
agents. For example, they treat their agents better. Under Assumptions-3a and 3b, af-
ter controlling for an agent’s output, the probability of exit is lower for the agent of an
internally-hired manager.
Testable Implication - 3a: Pr (exit ; I ) < Pr (exit ;E)
Now, consider that managers can distribute the non-pecuniary utility to the agents in
a non-uniform manner. For example, managers attend to high output agents to prevent
them from exiting; i.e. @ m@ a > 0.
Assumption - 3c: @ 
I
m
@ a
>
@ Em
@ a
Assumption-3c states that the internally-hired managers attend to their high output
1The constant value of G implies productivity to be ￿rm-speci￿c. Appendix A.9 provides arguments for
why productivity could be ￿rm-speci￿c.
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agents better than the externally-hired managers. Now,
@Pr (exit ; a, m )
@ a
=  @ (
f ( a , m ) G
  )
@ f ( a, m )
(
@ f ( a, m )
@ a
+
@ f ( a, m )
@ m
.
@ m
@ a
)
Under Assumption-3c, the gradient of the exit rate with respect to output is lower for an
agent of the internally-hired managers.
Testable Implication - 3b: @Pr (exit ;I )@ a <
@Pr (exit ;E)
@ a
< 0
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Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter-3
C.1 Preference Ordering over Media Strategies
Let a( ) 2 { 1,1} be the eventual policy chosen by the majority of voters for a given
 . Let a( ) ⇠ F (·; ) be the distribution of a( ). F (·; ) depends on the ex post policy
preference of each group in an equilibrium. Note that the biased groups do not change
their policy preferences no matter what information they receive. However, updaters
may vary their policy choice if they observe state-relevant information. Hence, F (·; ) is
potentially altered by the choice of mˆ of the updaters but is independent of mˆ chosen by
the biased group.
For i 2 {L,R}, preference over M is determined by:
Vi (mˆ) =  E  (m( )   bi ( ))2 + Ki ,
where Ki =  E  (a( )   bi ( ))2. KL and KR are independent of mˆ chosen by the biased
groups.
For i = R,bR ( ) = 18 
VR (mˆ) =  Pr (  = 1) (m(1)   1)2   Pr (  =  1) (m( 1)   1)2 + KR . Thus,
VR (mT ) =  2 + KR
VR (m  ) =  1 + KR
VR (mr ) =  12 + KR
VR (ml ) =  52 + KR
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VR (mR ) = KR
VR (mL) =  4 + KR
Hence, VR (mR ) > VR (mr ) > VR (m  ) > VR (mT ) > VR (ml ) > VR (mL).
For i = L,bL ( ) =  18 
VL (mˆ) =  Pr (  = 1) (m(1) + 1)2   Pr (  =  1) (m( 1) + 1)2 + KL. Thus,
VL (mT ) =  2 + KL
VL (m  ) =  1 + KL
VL (mr ) =  52 + KL
VL (ml ) =  12 + KL
VL (mR ) =  4 + KL
VL (mL) = KL
Hence, VL (mL) > VL (ml ) > VL (m  ) > VL (mT ) > VL (mr ) > VL (mR ).
For i = U ,bU ( ) =  
VU (mˆ) =  Pr (  = 1) (m(1)   1)2   Pr (  =  1) (m( 1) + 1)2 + KU
where, KU =  E  (a( )    )2. If updaters choose state-contingent message pro￿les, then
a( ) =   for each  . Hence, whenever updaters choose mˆ = {mT ,ml ,mr }, KU = 0. Thus,
VU (mT ) = KU = 0
VU (mr ) =  12 + KU =  12
VU (ml ) =  12 + KU =  12
If updaters have to choose fromm  ,mR andmL, their posterior beliefs are the same as
their priors, since messages are state-invariant. In that case, they are split evenly between
a = 1 and a =  1. Since we have assumed that   >  , a = 1 is chosen by the majority.
Now, KU =  12 (1   1)2   12 (1 + 1)2 =  2. Thus,
VU (m  ) =  1 + KU =  3
VU (mR ) =  2 + KU =  4
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VU (mL) =  2 + KU =  4
Hence, VU (mT ) > VU (ml ) = VU (mr ) > VU (m  ) > VU (mR ) = VL (mL).
C.2 Proof of Theorem-1
Table C.1 provides the payo￿s for ￿rms using the old technology as a normal form game.
Table C.1: Old Technology
mT m  mr ml mR mL
mT 1/2, 1/2 µ,  +   µ +  ,  µ +  ,  µ +  ,  µ +  , 
m    +  ,µ 1/2, 1/2  ,  + µ  ,µ +     + µ,    + µ, 
mr  ,µ +     + µ,  1/2, 1/2   + µ2 ,  +
µ
2 µ +  ,    + µ, 
ml  ,µ +   µ +  ,    +
µ
2 ,  +
µ
2 1/2, 1/2 µ +  ,    + µ, 
mR  ,µ +    ,  + µ  ,µ +    ,µ +   1/2, 1/2   + µ2 ,  +
µ
2
mL  ,  + µ  ,  + µ  ,µ +    ,µ +     +
µ
2 ,  +
µ
2 1/2, 1/2
Assume there exists a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Since under old technology,
pro￿ts are the same as the share of audience,    +   0 = 1, where   2 1,2 indexes ￿rms. If
   <
1
2 , then ￿rm-  can deviate to ￿rm-  0’s strategy, split the audience evenly, and increase
pro￿ts to 12 . If    =    0 =
1
2 , then either ￿rm can unilaterally deviate to a strategy where
two voter-consumer groups switch to the deviating ￿rm, increasing pro￿ts to greater than
half. Thus, no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists.
First, I will ￿nd the mixed strategy equilibrium where both ￿rms assign the same
positive probabilities to only mT , m  and mr . Then, I will show that this is the unique
equilibrium; no other equilibrium is possible where a ￿rm assigns positive probability to
a strategy mˆ 2 M   {mT ,m mr }.
Let a1, a2 and a3 be the probabilities of playingmT ,m  andmr , respectively by ￿rm-
2. Let  1(mˆ) be the pro￿t function for ￿rm-1 on playing strategy mˆ. Given the mixed
strategy of ￿rm-2, the pro￿ts of ￿rm-1 are given by:
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E ( 1(mT )) = a1(
1
2   µ    )   a2  + µ +  
E ( 1(m  )) = a1( ) + a2(
1
2    ) +  
E ( 1(mr )) = a1(    12 ) + a2(  + µ  
1
2 ) +
1
2
If￿rm-1 assigns positive probabilities tomT ,m  andmr , thenE ( 1(mT )) = E ( 1(m  )) =
E ( 1(mr )). The system of equation in a1 and a2 has the following solution: a1 = 1   2 
and a2 = 2(µ +  )   1.
Let b1, b2 and b3 be the probabilities of playingmT ,m  andmr , respectively by ￿rm-
1. Let  2(mˆ) be the pro￿t function for ￿rm-2 on playing strategy mˆ. Given the mixed
strategy of ￿rm-1,
E ( 2(mT )) = b1(
1
2   µ    )   b2  + µ +  
E ( 2(m  )) = b1( ) + b2(
1
2    ) +  
E ( 2(mr )) = b1(    12 ) + b2(  + µ  
1
2 ) +
1
2
If ￿rm-2 assigns positive probabilities to mT , m  and mr , E ( 2(mT )) = E ( 2(m  )) =
E ( 2(mr )). The system of equation in b1 and b2 has the following solution: b1 = 1   2 
and b2 = 2(µ +  )   1.
Thus, in the equilibrium, a1 = b1, a2 = b2 and a3 = b3; both ￿rms use the same mixed
strategy.
Uniqueness
First, note that if   >   then   + µ2 >   +
µ
2 . Since   +
µ
2 +   +
µ
2 = 1, therefore,   +
µ
2 >
1
2 .
Thus, mr strictly dominates mL. Hence, no equilibrium exists where mL is played with
positive probability.
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Assume there exists a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium where ￿rm-2 assigns prob-
abilities al and aR to ml and mR , respectively, where al 2 (0,1), aR 2 (0,1) and al +
aR  1. Given these mixed strategies of ￿rm-2, for ￿rm-1, E ( 1(mr )) > E ( 1(mR )) and
E ( 1(mr )) > E ( 1(ml )). Firm-1 will not playmR andml , and may randomize overmT ,m 
andmr with probabilities b1, b2 and b3, respectively. Now, for ￿rm-2,
E ( 2(mr )) = b1  + b2(  + µ ) + b3(
1
2 )
E ( 2(mR )) = b1  + b2  + b3 
E ( 2(ml )) = b1  + b2(  + µ ) + b3(  +
µ
2 )
For any possible randomization by ￿rm-1, E ( 2(mr )) > E ( 2(ml )). If b1 = 1,  2(m  ) >
 2(mR ). Otherwise, E ( 2(mr )) > E ( 2(mR )). This contradicts the hypothesis that ￿rm-2
assigns positive probabilities to mR and ml . Analogous argument applies if al = 0 and
aR 2 (0,1) or if al 2 (0,1) and aR = 0. Hence, no mixed strategy equilibrium exists
where ￿rm-2 assigns positive probabilities tomR andml . Analogous argument applies for
￿rm-1 as well. Hence, we can restrict attention to mixed strategy equilibria where ￿rms
randomize only overmT ,m  andmr .
Now, we show that in any mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium each ￿rm assigns positive
probabilities tomT ,m  andmr .
Assume there exists a mixed strategy Nash Equilibriumwhere ￿rm-2 randomizes over
m  andmr with probabilities a and 1   a, respectively, and playsmT with 0 probability.
Pro￿ts for ￿rm-1 are:
E ( 1(mT )) = µ +     a 
E ( 1(m  )) = a(
1
2    ) +  
E ( 1(mr )) = a(
1
2    ) +
1
2
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Now, for ￿rm-1, E ( 1(mr )) > E ( 1(m  )). Thus, ￿rm-1 plays m  with probability 0, and
may randomize overmT andmr , with probabilities b and 1   b, respectively.
For ￿rm-2, E ( 2(mT )) = b ( 12 ) + (1   b) (µ +  ) and E ( 2(mr )) = b  + (1   b) ( 12 ). Since
µ +   > 12 >  , for any value of b 2 [0,1], E ( 2(mT )) > E ( 2(mr )). Hence, a mixed
strategy equilibrium where ￿rm-2 playsmT with probability 0 is not possible. Analogous
argument applies for ￿rm-1 as well.
Assume there exists a mixed strategy Nash Equilibriumwhere ￿rm-2 randomizes over
mT andm  with probabilities a and 1   a, respectively, and playsmr with 0 probability.
Pro￿ts for ￿rm-1 are:
E ( 1(mT )) = a(
1
2   µ ) + µ
E ( 1(m  )) = a(
1
2   µ ) +
1
2
E ( 1(mr )) =  aµ +   + µ
Now, for ￿rm-1, E ( 1(m  )) > E ( 1(mT )). Thus, ￿rm-1 playsmT with probability 0, and
may randomize overm  andmr , with probabilities b and 1   b, respectively.
For ￿rm-2, E ( 2(mr )) = b (  + µ ) + (1   b) ( 12 ) and E ( 2(m  )) = b ( 12 ) + (1   b) ( ). Since
 +µ > 12 >  , for any value of b 2 [0,1], E ( 2(mr )) > E ( 2(m  )). Hence, a mixed strategy
equilibriumwhere ￿rm-2 playsmr with probability 0 is not possible. Analogous argument
applies for ￿rm-1 as well.
Assume there exists a mixed strategy Nash Equilibriumwhere ￿rm-2 randomizes over
mT andmr with probabilities a and 1   a, respectively, and playsm  with 0 probability.
Pro￿ts for ￿rm-1 are:
E ( 1(mT )) = a(    12 ) + µ +  
E ( 1(m  )) = a  +  
E ( 1(mr )) = a(    12 ) +
1
2
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Now, for ￿rm-1, E ( 1(mr )) < E ( 1(mT )). Thus, ￿rm-1 plays mr with probability 0, and
may randomize overmT andm  , with probabilities b and 1   b, respectively.
For ￿rm-2, E ( 2(m  )) = b (  +  ) + (1   b) ( 12 ) and E ( 2(mT )) = b ( 12 ) + (1   b) (µ ). Since
  +   > 12 > µ, for any value of b 2 [0,1], E ( 2(m  )) > E ( 2(mT )). Hence, a mixed
strategy equilibrium where ￿rm-2 playsm  with probability 0 is not possible. Analogous
argument applies for ￿rm-1 as well.
Now, consider an equilibrium where ￿rm-2 plays a strategy, mˆ2, with probability 1.
For any mˆ2 , mR , there exists a unique best response for ￿rm-1, mˆ1 , mˆ2, such that
￿rm-1 receives more than half the audience. But, then ￿rm-2 can deviate to the strategy
of ￿rm-1, split all the audience evenly, and increase pro￿ts to 12 . If ￿rm-2 playsmR with
probability 1, then ￿rm-1 is indi￿erent betweenmT ,m  ,mr andml , and may randomize.
For any non-degenerate randomization by ￿rm-1, ￿rm-2 can deviate tomr pro￿tably. For
any degenerate randomization by ￿rm-1, as argued above, ￿rm-2 can deviate to ￿rm-
1’s strategy and increase pro￿ts. Thus, no equilibrium exists where ￿rm-2 plays a pure
strategy and ￿rm-1 plays a mixed strategy. Analogous argument applies for ￿rm-1 as well.
C.3 Proof of Theorem-2
Firms randomize over mT , m  and mr . The realized strategy from this randomization is
revealed before the state occurs. Thus, updaters know which strategy is being played.
If either ￿rm playsmT , then updaters observem = 1 when  = 1, andm =  1 and  =
 1. Their posterior beliefs are: Pr (  = 1|m = 1;mT ) = 1 and Pr (  =  1|m =  1;mT ) = 1
If either ￿rm playsmr , then updaters observem = 1 when   = 1, andm = 0 and   =
 1. Their posterior beliefs are: Pr (  = 1|m = 1;mr ) = 1 and Pr (  =  1|m = 0;mr ) = 1
With probabilitya2, ￿rms playm  . If both ￿rms playm  , updaters split evenly between
both the ￿rms and receivem = 0 as the message. Thus, posterior beliefs of all updaters
are: Pr (  = 1|m = 0;m  ) = Pr (  =  1|m = 0;m  ) = 12 . Thus, updaters remain indi￿erent
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between a =  1 and a = 1, splitting evenly between the two policies. Since we assume
  >  , a = 1 would be chosen as the political equilibrium. Thus, a = 1 is chosen by the
majority when   =  1 with probability Pr (  =  1)a22 = 12a22, .
C.4 Proof of Theorem-3
Table C.2 provides the payo￿ for di￿erent strategy pairs under new technology.
C.4.1 Case-1: µ    2
Consider strategy pro￿le (mR,mT ). Pro￿ts for ￿rm-1 are given by    and for ￿rm-2 are
 µ +  +12  , illustrated in the example in Section 3.4.
No unilateral pro￿table deviation for ￿rm-1 exists if  1(mR,mT ) >  1(mˆ,mT ) 8mˆ 2
M   {mR }i.e.:
   >  µ2 +
 +1
4 (  +  ) =)   >  + 3  2µ  
   >   +   =)   >  +  
   >  +12   =)   > 1
   >  +12   =)   >  2   
   >   
Given   >   and   > µ, we obtain 3    2µ     > 0 and 2      > 0. Hence, for a
su￿ciently high positive value of   , all conditions are satis￿ed.
For ￿rm-2, no unilateral pro￿table deviation exists if  2(mR,mT ) >  2(mR,mˆ) 8mˆ 2
M   {mT }; i.e.
 µ +  +12   >   + µ =)   (µ +  2 ) > µ +  2
 µ +  +12   >
 +1
2 µ +   =)   ( µ2 +  2 ) > µ2 +  2
 µ +  +12   >
 +1
2 (µ +  ) =)   µ2 > µ2
 µ +  +12   >
  
2 +
 +µ
2 =)   > µ(2µ+   )
 µ +  +12   >    +
µ
2 =)   > µ  (2µ  )
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Since µ +   = 1     > 12 >   and µ    2 , all conditions are satis￿ed for a su￿ciently
high positive value of   .
Uniqueness
First, note thatm  is dominated bymR for a su￿ciently high value of  . Thus,m  is never
played.
From the above proof, when µ    2 , mR is the best response to mT and vice versa.
Thus, if a ￿rm playsmR , the other ￿rm will not play mˆ 2 M   {mT } in a Nash Equilib-
rium. Similarly, if a ￿rm playsmT , the other ￿rm will not play mˆ 2 M   {mR } in a Nash
Equilibrium.
Now, if a ￿rm plays a strategy mˆ  2 {mr ,ml ,mL}, given Assumption 3, Table C.2 shows
that the best response for the other ￿rm is eithermR ormT . But, the best response to either
of the two strategies is mˆ < {mr ,ml ,mL}. Thus, a strategy pro￿le of the form (mˆ  ,mˆ   ),
where mˆ  and mˆ  0 2 {mr ,ml ,mL}, and   2 {1,2} indexes ￿rm, cannot be a Nash Equilib-
rium.
Thus, no other strategy pro￿le can be a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
C.4.2 Case-2: µ <  2
Consider strategy pro￿le (mR,mL), where ￿rm-1 commits to extreme right slant and ￿rm-2
chooses extreme left slant. All right-biased voter-consumers choose ￿rm-1 and left-biased
voter-consumers choose ￿rm-2. Updaters are split evenly between the two ￿rms. Pro￿ts
for ￿rm-1 are given by:
 2(mR,mL) = Pr (  = 1) mPr (m |  = 1,mR ) ( R  + U µ2 )
+Pr (  =  1) mPr (m |  =  1,mR ) ( R  + U µ2 )
140
Sincem( ) = 18  undermR , right-biased group provides value   in each state, whereas
 U = 1 in each state.
 2(mR,mL) =
1
2 (   +
µ
2 ) +
1
2 (   +
µ
2 )
 2(mR,mL) =    +
µ
2
Similarly, pro￿ts for ￿rm-2 are  2(mR,mL) =    + µ2 .
For ￿rm-1, no unilateral pro￿table deviation exists if  1(mR,mL) >  1(mˆ,mL) 8mˆ 2
M   {mR }i.e.:
   + µ2 >  µ +
 +1
2   =)   >      2µ
   + µ2 >   + µ =)   > 2 +µ 
   + µ2 >
 +1
2 (µ +  ) =)   >    µ
   + µ2 >
 +1
2 µ +   =)   > 2 2  µ
   + µ2 >
  
2 +
 +µ
2 =)   >  2  µ
Given   >   > 2µ > µ, all conditions are satis￿ed for a su￿ciently high positive value
of   .
For ￿rm-2, no unilateral pro￿table deviation exists if  2(mR,mL)    2(mR,mˆ) 8mˆ 2
M   {mL}; i.e.
   + µ2 >  µ +
 +1
2   =)   (  2   µ ) > µ2    2
   + µ2 >   + µ =)   > 2 +µ2 
   + µ2 >
 +1
2 µ +   =)   (    µ2 ) >  
   + µ2 >
 +1
2 (µ +  ) =)   >    µ
   + µ2 >
  
2 +
 +µ
2 =)   >  2   
Given   >  2 > µ and 2  = max {2 ,2 } >  , all conditions are satis￿ed for a su￿-
ciently high positive value of   .
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Uniqueness
First note that the above proof shows that when µ <  2 , mL is the best response to mR
and vice versa. Thus, if a ￿rm playsmL, then the other ￿rm will not play mˆ 2 M   {mR }
in a Nash Equilibrium. Similarly, if a ￿rm plays mR , then the other ￿rm will not play
mˆ 2 M   {mL} in a Nash Equilibrium.
Now, if a ￿rm plays a strategy mˆ  2 {mr ,ml ,mT }, given Assumption 3, Table C.2
shows that the best response for the other ￿rm is mR . But, the best response to mR is
mL < {mr ,ml ,mT }. Thus, strategy pro￿les of the form (mˆ  ,mˆ   ), where mˆ  and mˆ  0 2
{mr ,ml ,mT }, and   2 {1,2} indexes ￿rm, cannot be a Nash Equilibrium.
Thus, no other strategy pro￿le can be a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
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C.5 Proof of Theorem-4
Posterior probabilities are given by:
Pr (  = 1|m;mˆ) = Pr (m |  = 1;mˆ)
Pr (m |  = 1;mˆ) + Pr (m |  =  1;mˆ)
C.5.1 Case-1: µ    2
Updaters watchmT , where they observem 2 { 1,1}. Thus,
Pr (  = 1|m = 1;mT ) = 1
Pr (  = 1|m =  1;mT ) = 0 =) Pr (  =  1|m =  1;mT ) = 1
Hence, updaters realize each state with full certainty and they prefer a =   for each
  2 { 1,1}.
C.5.2 Case-2: µ <  2
Updaters are indi￿erent betweenmL andmR . When they watchmR , they observem = 1
for each state. Thus, Pr (  = 1|m = 1;mR ) = 12
Similarly, updaters who choosemL observem =  1 for each state. Thus, Pr (  = 1|m =
1;mL) = 12
Hence, updaters remain indi￿erent between a = 1 and a =  1. Since   >  , a = 1 is
chosen by the majority in each state.
C.6 Extension to N Firms
Let there be n ￿rms. Let the strategy pro￿le be
(mˆ)ni=1 = ((mT )
nt
i=1, (mR )
nt+nr
i=nt+1, (mL)
n
i=nt+nr+1) 8  2 { 1,0,1}
,
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Pro￿ts for a truth-telling ￿rm are  t (mˆ)ni=1 =
 µ
nt
. If it deviates tomR , then its pro￿ts are
  (mR, (mˆ)n 1i=1 ) =
  
nr+1 . Thus, deviation is not pro￿table if µ >
nt  
nr+1 . Similarly, deviation to
mˆ =mL is not pro￿table if µ > nt nl+1 .
Now, pro￿ts for a right-leaning ￿rm are    (mˆ)ni=1 =
  
nr
. Deviation tomT and tomL is
not pro￿table if µ < (nt+1) nr and
 
  >
nr 
nl+1 , respectively.
Compiling all conditions, we get the following conditions as su￿cient for (mˆ)ni=1 to be
Nash Equilibrium:
min{  (nt + 1)
nr
,
 (nt + 1)
nl
} > µ > max {   (nt )
(nr + 1)
,
 (nt )
(nl + 1)
} (C.1)
nr + 1
nl
>
 
 
>
nr
nl + 1
(C.2)
Values of  &   endogenously determine the number of ￿rms for each content. Thus,
even with arbitrary number of ￿rms, truth-telling may be a Nash Equilibrium strategy,
for appropriate distribution of preferences. This is consistent with Groseclose and Milyo
(2005) ￿nding that while media generally exhibits a left-shift, there still exist truthful
reporting, such as ABC’s GoodMorning America and PBS’ Newshour with higher average
net ratings.
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